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ABSTRACT
The purpose of this study is to interpret the actions
of Edwin M. Stanton in the wake of the Lincoln
assassination, based on his personality characteristics and
behavioral history.
The writer examined the principal evidence gathered by
various writers that suggested that Stanton was involved in
the assassination.
A study of Stanton’s personality and behavioral
history reveals that the characteristics of fear and
anxiety were predominant and produced other characteristics
such as deceit, vindictiveness, secrecy, and insubord
ination.
Stanton’s fear of the rebel conspiracy was so
pervasive that it dominated his personality during the war
years.
M a n y of the ac tions St a n t o n took in the wake of the
assassination fit easily into his personality framework,
including such items as the midnight burial of Booth and the
abnormal security precautions taken with respect to the
Lincoln conspirators.
The results of this study suggest that Edwin M.
St a n t o n did not p l a y any kind of r o l e in the c o n s p i r a c y to
kill Lincoln, but that his unusual actions can be
understood only within the context of his own unique
personality.

EDWIN M. STANTON AND THE LINCOLN ASSASSINATION

INTRODUCTION
Psychohistory, as it is generally known, encompasses a
wide variety of analytical approaches.

Traditionally,

historians sought to record merely what had happened and
why.

A disastrous diplomatic move by a world leader, would

be explained by reference to that leader’s insatiable
ambition or stubbornness.

The origins of that ambition or

stubbornness, which lie in the individual psyche,

were

either ignored or subjected to ’’armchair” psychology.

It

is to the question of psychological motivation in history
that psychohistory addresses itself.

Psychohistory picks

up where traditional history ends, pursuing the true
origins of personality traits and their effect on
historical figures and events.

This field of endeavor began

by applying the childhood traumas, drives, and defenses
discovered by Freud to historical figures.
approach continues,

Though this

as evidenced by the Journal of Psycho-

history (formerly History of Childhood Quarterly), various
newer approaches have captured the imagination of
psychohistorians.

Particular attention will be given to

the forms most appropriate to the type of analysis this
thesis employs.
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A standard approach to the study of political
is found in "personality studies."

leaders

Promoted by political

biographers like Fred Greenstein, these studies first
discuss the "phenomenology" of a person,
traits and characteristics.

or his personality

The second stage consists of

identifying the personality dynamics of a leader,

or the

syndromes suggested by his characteristics and how they
interact with the societal environment.

Finally, a

personality study forms a genetic hypothesis of the
individual,

which is an identification of the origins of

those traits or syndromes.^

In general, psychological

method is introduced in the second and third stages.
first stage has been used by historians

The

since Thucydides,

at least by those who h a v e b o t h e r e d to d e s cr ibe the
character of historical figures.

The most prominent study

using the Greenstein model is Woodrow Wilson and Colonel
House by Alexander and Juliette George.
The Georges summed up W i l s o n ’s personality traits in a
research note attached at the end of the work.

They found

that he displayed a compulsive, insatiable ambition, as
w e l l as a lu st for power, w h et he r he was P r e s i d e n t of
Princeton University or of the United States.2

The dynamic

analysis of W i l s o n ’s traits described his pursuit of power
and ambition as compensatory devices for a feeling of
inadequacy and i n f e r i o r i t y . 3

His need to dominate any

endeavor in which he was involved often crippled his

4
ability to maneuver and compromise, which he knew to be
imperatives of the political process.

Certain measures

became a test of p e r s o n a l worth, on wh ich he c o u l d not give
an inch.

Such feelings quickly transcended the immediate

political task at h a n d . 4

An example was W i l s o n ’s effort to

win approval for the League of Nations in 1919*

When his

enemies b o t t l e d up the League in the Senate wi t h a demand
for reservations, he would not budge.

It became an

intensely personal battle that he waged to its bitter and
self-defeating end, when compromise would have carried the
day.
The genetic hypothesis put forward by the Georges
traces W i l s o n ’s traits and personality dynamics to feelings
of inadequacy and inferiority developed in his childhood.
W i l s o n ’s father unceasingly criticized Woodrow and made
sarcastic barbs whenever his son failed to achieve
perfection.

This exacting form of domination by his

father, and the inferiority it generated, drove Wilson in
his later years to abhor and resist the demands of others.
”He was assuredly driven to his passionate stubbornness by
the irresistible, never-articulated need to retaliate
against the kind of domination he had once endured at the
hands of his f a t h e r . ”5

Thus,

he could not bow to the

demands of the Senate and Henry Cabot Lodge without
destroying the core of his personal integrity.
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Many historians hailed the Georges’ analysis as a
superb example of psychohistorical work; yet criticism of
it continues because of the presumptive nature of the
genetic analysis.

As Bernard Brodie has noted,

"it is one

thing to observe compulsive behavior and identify it for
what it is; it is quite another to find the original
causes."7

Even Greenstein wondered whether genetic

analysis was worth the effort,

given the less equivocal

nature of the phenomenology and dynamic

stages.8

Historian

Page Smith agreed that the shaky speculations about
W i l s o n ’s relationship with his father really ”do not in the
end add to our understanding of his triumphs and his
ultimate t r a g e d y . ”9
Georges',

Thus,

even in a superb work like the

one can vali dly question the necessity and value

of extending an overview of personality into a
psychological explanation of inner motivation.
Another approach to psychohistory is the "repetition
compulsion" method employed and deveoped by Rudolph Binion.
Binion applied this particular "traumatic mechanism" to
Belgium's King Leopold and his neutrality policy in the
years prior to World War I.

The King subconsciously led

his nation to diplomatic and military disaster as a
repetition of a traumatic car accident years earlier, in
w h i c h he was the d r i v e r and his wife a f a t a l victim.
Binion also used his theory to explain Hitler's philosophy
and leadership.

Hitler is alleged to have had a
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subconscious desire to lead his nation into another world
war as a repetition of World War I, which had reawakened
traumatic feelings from Hit ler’s childhood.

His Jewish

policy was an effort to replay and final ly expunge the
guilt he felt at directing a Jewish doctor to administer
fatal medicine to his m o t h e r . T h e

repetition theory is a

classic example of the presumptive nature of psychoanalytic
theory,

for Binion based much of his work on Freud’s

theories.

On the issue of the absence of documentary

evidence, Binion argued that "no amount or kind of evidence
can turn a psychohistorical insight into an inference.”

12

Another emerging area of the psychohistorical field is
cognitive psychohistory.

This approach seeks to determine

the process by which men and women make sense of their
society and formulate responses to its stimuli. 13

Often

this involves identifying operational belief systems in
order to reveal the underlying motives of political
leaders.

These determinations are much more verifiable

since documentary evidence plays a large part in forming
them.

Given that the aim of such analysis is the

cognitive, or conscious, functions of the particular person
or group,

the instinctual origins of psychoanalytic theory

rarely come into play.

In fact, historians have used

cognitive psychohistory, without rigid guidelines, for
years.14

Trait psychohistory is a related approach,

one

that merely seeks the underlying personality components of

7
historical action.

In general,

traits are organized into

certain specific categories of character types and
individual actions are then predicted given the character
and the situation presented.
group analysis,

This is especially useful in

and has been applied to the revolutionary'

movement in Colonial

America.^

5

Cognitive and trait psychohistory are part of a
broader category of descriptive psychological analysis,
which has found greater favor in the historical profession
than any other type of psychohistorical approach.

As

mentioned earlier, descriptive psychology is very distinct
from analytic psychology,
hidden impulses.

which deals with instinct and

Faye Crosby has called this approach

"coherent whole explanation.”^

These explanations aim to

make plain a given pattern of behavior within an individual
or group, to state the meaning of a set of behaviors or
events.

Nonsensical behavior is analyzed to determine its

consistency with prior behavioral or trait patterns of
individuals and groups.

Crosby outlines a five-step

procedure for doing descriptive psychohistory:

1) document

the behavior and events, 2) justify the presence of
psychological factors, 3) identify the factors and discount
other probable factors,

4) present a concise explanation,

and 5) reconcile co ntrad i c t i o n s . ^
Descriptive psychohistory is closest to the analytical
approach used in this thesis.

As a result of the flaws in

a
!■
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psychohistory in general, which wi ll be reviewed in a
moment, this thesis rejects an explicit use of any of the
above theories.

Since the purpose of this thesis is solely

to explain the odd events that occurred after Lincoln's
assassination,

the focus will be on identifying prior

behavior by Secretary of War Stanton which makes his
actions during the assassination period consistent with his
own personality, if not reality itself.

The objective will

be to refute notions that Stanton was involv ed in the
conspiracy,

while giving a satisfactory explanation of his

irrational behavior.

While this sounds like "coherent

whole explanation," it wi ll reject clinical categories and
syndromes for common descriptions of character and
personality
course,

(secretiveness,

vindictiveness,

etc.).

Of

we are not concerned with why Stanton developed

these characteristics,

so no psychoanalytic or genetic

analysis will be involved.
approach is maintained,

The reason why this traditional

and theory and method rejected,

is

found in the criticisms outlined below.
Criticism of the psychohistorical approach has been
extensive.

Jacques Barzun, perhaps the most voc-al critic,

attacked the basic premise that psychology can be an
element of historical analysis.

He emphasizes the extreme

complexity of historical causation,

noting that the whole

purpose of writing history is to show "the vagarious
disorder of human affairs,

the force of the irrational,

the
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unstructured character of the past, and the futility of
trying to make it say something unshakable in answer to
system and method."18

Stressing instead an intuitive

handling of historical evidence, Barzun argues that
historical writing is the very "counterpart of method,
equally sound and particularly heal th-giving."1 9

The

reader of history should not be consigned "to a siege of
Hineinstudieren." much less to a weighing of "pros and cons
among the dubities and contradictions of rival

systems."

20

While Barzun is consistent in his criticism of method
(quantitative analysis is attacked as well),

few historians

have been prepared to dismiss psychohistory so readily;
they focus instead on several specific,

serious problems

with its application.
Evidentiary problems,
striking in this field.

for instance, are particularly

As Erik Erikson admitted,

psychohistorians must be prepared "to relinquish the
security of seemingly more objective methods."21

Though

Erikson tried to establish rigorous, austere criteria for
"psychohistorical evidence," such standards are not
commonly observed in practice.22

Bruce Mazlish,

another

careful psychohistorian, opined that "the application of
psychoanalytic method to patients who are dead.

. .and

which analysis must proceed in terms of a one-way Socratic
dialogue with their remaining documents is fraught with
dangers."23

What these psychohistorians quite admirably
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realized was that their approach often employs a heavy
ratio of theory to historical fact.
that this is irrelevant,

Rudolph Binion argues

that "soft data may yield solid,

and hard data shaky conclusions."^

Barzun disagrees,

countering that psychohistory cannot be properly challenged
and criticized once it steps off "the common ground of
evidence.
Psychoanalysts agree that psychohistory has serious
evidentiary problems,

for the simple reason that

biographers can rarely retrieve enough information on their
subjects to do a proper analysis.26
scant,

Secondary material is

and diaries and letters often record only moods.

Dream material is extremely rare.

Compared to the

information obtained during the course of therapy with a
view toward completeness, the written material concerning
historical figures is essentially negligible.27
void of fact,

Into the

psychohistorians introduce theory and method.

While theory is not an adequate substitute for data,
psychohistorians compound the problem by using it to twist
data in analogical and metaphorical

w

a

y

s

.

Thus, the data

is of no intrinsic importance; rather it serves as a
convenient "hanger" for a theoretical message.

In the end,

"bold assertion, emphatic reiteration, clincical
anecdotage,

and a richly metaphorical terminology all

contribute to masking the paucity of empirical
verification.n29
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Evidentiary weaknesses result in another major
problem - reductionism.

As Gerald Izenberg describes it,

hypotheses about early developments in a person’s life,
which there is no evidence,

for

are ’’speculatively deduced from

30

adult events and then used to explain those events.”

Psychohistorical explanations transform all outward or
public behavior into the product of intrapsychic
conflict.31

Reducing historical events to the product of

deterministic, neurotic mechanisms is widely seen as a
problem by psychohistorians themselves.
fact,

Norman Brown, in

argues that psychoanalytic method is truly a way out

of history.32

yet Erikson and Mazlish argue that

psychology and history need not be exclusive, while
recognizing the existence of reductionism.

Of course,

Barzun is particularly eloquent on this issue, claiming
that psychohistory seeks to ’’dispose of history and
civilization,

of human error and achievement,

rather then

contemplate them.”33
As a result of these criticisms, many practitioners in
the field have reconsidered many of the bolder approaches.
This reevaluation consists of giving greater weight to ego
and reality factors and less weight to drives and
defenses.34-

Efforts to integrate sociology with

psychoanalytic theory are being encouraged by
psychobiographers like Fred Weinstein and Gerald Platt.35
Part of the impetus behind this reform lies in the
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realization that the psychological models of human
development constructed by Erik Erikson and others in the
twentieth century are inappropriate for historical social
contexts.

How does one apply these models "to ages that

knew endemic famine,

awoke and went to sleep with the sun,

and suffered extremes of heat and cold as a norm?"36
Lawrence Stone has argued that four of the main traumas
Freud found to be universal among his patients "are
dependent on particular experiences which did not happen to
the vas t m a j o r i t y of p e o p l e in most of the re c o r d e d
past."37

Consequently,

psychohistorical work in the future

is likely to take greater account of external social
pressures than in the past.
Some criticism has been directed toward the state of
flux in both the fields of psychology and psychohistory.
The historian,

and much more so his reader,

are faced with

a myriad "rival and contradictory theories of human
development from among which he must choose an initial
hypothesis."38

The answers that result from the different

theories vary radically.

This is not to say that

traditional approaches to history are free of criticism.
Rather,

in the psychohistorical context, it is particularly

striking how the same evidence yields opposite results
depending upon the model used.

What might be repetitious

phenomena to Binion could be classic drives phenomena to
Llyod DeMause.

As was mentioned earlier, psychoanalysts do
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not even believe a marriage between psychology and history
is possible.

Thus, we have come full circle.

Psychohistory must divorce itself from fact,
makes it reductionist.

which often

The discussion about accuracy then

becomes one for the psychoanalysts,
union with history is possible.

who do not believe the

This confusion within

psychohistory suggests that a limited version of
personality analysis may be more appropriate in most
contexts.
A limited approach need not sacrifice the goal of
effective historical interpretation.

Eugene Genovese has

concluded that the psychological element of interpretation,
while perhaps correct, is essentially irrelevant.

39

Knowing whether a guilt complex or a subconscious
repetition is responsible for a leader's actions is
unlikely to add much to our historical knowledge.

Thus,

many historians argue for a retreat to some sort of
psychohistorical empiricism or cognitive

d i s s o n a n c e . 4-0

While personality can be extremely important in
understanding historical events, divining why the
personality came about is tangential to the task of
historical explanation in most cases.

What is required is

the first stage of the Weinstein model, phenomenology, and
half of the second, dynamics.

Identifying the personality

traits and organizing Stanton's display of them in
situational contexts will serve as an adequate basis for

u
explaining his actions after the assassination.
Explanation of motive,

or genetic analysis, will be avoided

as unnecessary.
Psychohistorians might not accept this disavowal of
their methods.

Erikson noted that historians often disavow

the use of psychology and then proceed to make superficial
psychological statements throughout their work.4-1

Wi lli am

Langer's call for the application of psychology to history
in 1957 recognized that historians indulged freely in
psychological interpretation, by virtue of a "general
humanistic appreciation of personality."4-2

Other writers

agree that "a historian can scarcely compose a narrative
line without committing himself,

implicitly or explicitly,

to- some theory of personality and motivation."4-3
Nevertheless, historians should be able to identify
personality traits and characteristics, based on available
documentation,
actions.

and explain their relevance to historical

Saying,

for instance,

that Napoleon refused to

compromise because he was stubborn and ambitious should not
require an application of theory and method.

It permits

testing and criticism from other historians who read the
evidence differently.

Of course,

some topics may admit of

no other alternative than motivational inquiry.

But when,

as with this topic, there is no need for such analysis,
can and should be avoided.

it
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As we saw earlier,

some psychohistorians like

Greenstein have admitted the force of the argument that
biographers can be more effective by leaving out the
speculative genetic or developmental analysis.

Traditional

historians like Don Fehrenbacher feel that illuminating
historical data with psychological insight can be useful,
while data pressed into theoretical molds is of no use at
a l l .UU

Psychological inquiries which describe instead of

explain can be beneficial in historical research without
the patent dangers psychohistory has traditionally
presented.

The historian must be careful not to allow the

descriptive function to become a vehicle for "armchair
theorizing.”

But if he limits himself to a desriptive

study of personality traits,

the historian should be able

to explain most historical events requiring a look at
personality.
Some readers might prefer to label this thesis a form
of psychohistory, despite its limited objective.
Nevertheless,
depends,

what any psychohistorical work "ought to do

in turn,

on what it aims to do."4-5

This thesis

seeks only to explain the actions of Secretary of War
Stanton after the Lincoln assassination, based on
identifiable personality traits observed over the course of
his career.

It argues that Stanton’s behavior is

consistent with his personality profile, thus alleviating
the need for any motivational inquiry.

In many ways, this
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thesis parallels the work of Gamiliel Bradford at the turn
of the century.

In works like Union Portraits, Bradford

produced what he called ’’psychographs.”

Whatever he might

have meant by that, they were essentially personality
portraits of historical figures,

assimilating the many

traits passed over by standard biographers.

In some ways,

too, this thesis w i l l remind the r ea der of the wo rk of
Steven Allen and Peter Hoffer, who assembled personality
traits of revolutionary Americans and linked them to public
behavior during the 1 7 7 0 ’s.4-6
This thesis,

in essence,

stands on its own foundation.

No other personality study will be exactly like it, nor
should it be.

Each study must depend for its form on the

data available,
context.

the events explained, and the historical

The Lincoln Assassination was a unique event.

Some writers originally suggested that Stanton may have
played a role in the conspiracy.

Others

(the vast majority

today) refute this idea by accepting Stanton’s behavior as
rational and appropriate.
satisfactory.

Neither conclusion is

This thesis will put to rest the conspiracy

theory for good, while at the same time recognizing and
explaining the vagaries of Stanton’s character and how they
related to his behavior.

It will not in volve still another

belabored review of the assassination; rather it wi ll
assume a good deal of knowledge on the r e a d e r ’s part.
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A few notes of caution are in order.

The nature of

this study does not al l o w a complete biography of Stanton,
nor a completely balanced view of his tenure as Secretary
of War.

Stanton displayed several noble characteristics

during his public career, for which he will receive little
credit in this study.

Only those traits relevant to the

assassination period will be discussed.
extent possible,

Also, to the

information about Stanton is included only

if it appears in more than one contemporary source or is
derived from Stanton’s personal communications.
latter are rarely plentiful,

Since the

his actions will be viewed

primarily through the eyes of others.

A sincere attempt

has been made to screen the personal prejudices of those
contemporaries and to use the accounts given by Stanton’s
political allies whenever feasible.
Finally, this thesis makes no grand claims.

It seeks

to light one candle of historical interpretation in the
vast darkness that one hundred and twenty years have cast
on the melancholy events of April,

1865.

To the extent

that it succeeds in doing so, the study of personality will
emerge as a strong scholarly complement to biography and
psychohistory.
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CHAPTER I
STANTON AND THE HISTORIANS
As the gallows neared completion,
have seemed incessant.to Anna Surratt.

the hammering must
Each blow which

reverberated through the Arsenal grounds represented
another nail in the coffin of her mother, sentenced to hang
for aiding and abetting the assassination of Abraham
Lincoln.

As Anna waited anxiously with friends under a hot

July sun for news of a last-minute reprieve,
of it a l l was too much for her.
wonder why.
mistake?

the injustice

She c o u l d not h e l p but

Was her mother the victim of a tragic judicial

Was she the victim of an anti-Southern hysteria?

Was she the victim of mal evolent men in the War Department?
Or was she the v i c t i m of her own kno wl edge, the kind of
information which could implicate high Union officials in
the assassination conspiracy?
The latter explanation has been repeated often in
popular writings about the assassination, and has been the
vehicle for implicating Edwin M. Stanton in the murder
plot.

Though whisperings were often heard about Radical

complicity the first seventy-five years after the
assassination, it was in 1939 that Otto Eisenschiml opened
the debate about Edwin M. Stanton.
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In Why Was Lincoln
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Murdered? , Eisenschiml suggested that Stanton may have
been behind the assassination.

All subsequent work on the

subject has taken Eisenschiml’s questions into account and
therefore his thesis deserves close scrutiny.
Eisenschiml scoured the records concerning the
assassination and found disturbing evidence.

One line from

John Wilkes Booth’s diary was particularly interesting:
have almost a mind to return to Washington and.
name,

which I feel I can do.”*'

even more

”1

. .clear my

Several things made this

suspicious in Eisenschiml’s eyes.

Booth’s diary

was delivered to Stanton immediately after his capture and
then ’’los t” or ’’hidden” by Stanton in the War Department
fi l e s for two years, u n t i l the tri al of John Su rra tt in
1867.

Additionally, John Wilkes Booth was shot at

Garrett’s barn against strict orders -to the contrary,

and

was not interviewed during his lingering death there.
Eisenschiml,

moreover, felt that Booth’s escape from

Washington raised the most serious questions about
Stanton’s involvement.

Stanton vigorously prevented his

telegraph office Major Thomas T. Eckert, from attending
Ford’s Theater with Lincoln on the night of the
assassination.

Eckert was a very strong individual and

would have provided Lincoln with extra protection.
Parker,

John F.

who was to guard Lin coln ’s box and who left his

post before the a s s a s s i n a t i o n to h a v e a dr ink in a n earb y
tavern, remained on the White House guard force without any
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investigation into vhis negligent behavior.

He was

dismissed, significantly, in 1868 after Stanton left office
2
for minor violations of police protocol.
Other strange things occurred on that fateful night.
Booth was al lowed to cross the Navy Yard bridge into
Maryland without hesitation.

His closest pursuer,

a

stableman chasing Davy Herold for stealing a horse, was
turned back by a w a r n i n g that he w o u l d not be a l l o w e d back
across the bridge if he continued.

This

stableman's story,

given to the authorities just after midnight, was not
treated by them as a possible clue to Booth's escape route.
His route, which was the most obvious one to the south since
it had fewer troop garrisons stationed along it, was left
unpatrolled.

Moreover,

the Federal forces in southern

Maryland were the last to receive instructions concerning
the pursuit of Booth.

Stanton then delayed the

transmission of Booth's name to the newspapers for a full
two hours after it bec ame cl ea r that Boo th was the
assassin.

Finally,

when one officer found Booth's trail in

southern Maryland, he was recalled to Washington, and
Stanton's most trusted lieutenants,

Lafayette and Luther

Ba ker of the secret service, were g i v e n the task of
3
completing the capture.
To Eisenschiml,

this suggested that Stanton may have

facilitated Booth's escape and then had him killed to keep
him from talking about his accomplices in Washington.

In
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support of this theory,

the author offers Lafayette Bakerfs

version of Stanton’s reaction to the news that Booth had
been captured (he did not yet know that he had been
killed);

»’S ecretary Stanton was distinguished during the

whole war for his coolness,

but I had never seen such an

exhibition of it in my life as at that time.

He put his

hand s o v e r his eyes, and la y for n e a r l y a moment without
saying a word.

Then he got up and put his coat on very

coolly.
This rather strange response was natural for a man
a bo ut to be i m p l i c a t e d in a crime, not for a man o v e r j o y e d
at an assassin’s capture.

Eisenschiml argued further that

Johnson (then presumed to be a Radical) had not been an
intended victim after all,

but that conspirator George

Atzerodt’s room at Johnson’s hotel had been set up to give
that i m p r e s s i o n . 5

This argument is buttressed by the fact

that Booth and Herold never mentioned Johnson as a victim to
anyone during their escape,

just Lincoln and Seward.

Since

these two were considered to be the moderates of the
Administration,

Eisenschiml contended that the Radicals

were behind the attacks,
Apparently,

particularly,

Edwin M. Stanton.

Atzerodt never knew of the murder plot.

Eisenschiml cited other assorted evidence to back up
his suggestion that Stanton was involved.

He argued that

Stanton’s implication of the Confederate leadership just
after the assssination was designed to divert attention
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from himself and that he deliberately misinterpreted the
evidence in his possession in order to do it.6
addition,
brother,

In

the author discovered that the picture of Booth’s
Edwin, was used throughout the pursuit even though

it bore only slight resemblance to the assassin.
Eisenschiml found this error incomprehensible and
attributed it to deliberate d e s i g n . 7

Perhaps the most

striking piece of evidence found by this historian is the
fact that Stanton revoked the reward for the capture of
John Surratt in late 1865 after he had received a petition
from someone who knew where Surratt was and who wanted him
extradited from Great Britain.8
Other suspicious tidbits were uncovered by Eisenschiml
as well.

Various portions of testimony were edited from

the official records of the trial of the conspirators,
including information which indicated that the War Office
knew of plots by Booth and others as early as March, 1865.
Also the author found it curious that Booth was buried
secretly in a midnight ceremony,

with minimal examination

of the body for identification and few witnesses.
In the case of Mary Surratt,

Eisenchiml went further

in his accusations, using the same kind of circumstantial
evidence,

ironically, that was used to convict the

conspirators at the trial.

He claimed that Surratt, whom

he considered to have been innocent, was executed because,
on the day of the assassination,

she was known to have
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spoken to Booth twice.

"This probably was the poor woman’s

r e a l g u i l t in the eyes of the War Department.

To r e m o v e

her forever was doubtless considered a matter of selfpreservation for the high Unknown [Booth’s accomplice]— if
there was such a person— who had used the assassin as his
pawn.”9

Eisenschiml was careful to qualify his hypothesis

with the following words:

’’There is not one point in this

summary that can be proven;

it is all hypothesis.

of al l facts known at this time,

. .In view

an indictment against

Stanton cannot be sustained for lack of material
evidence."^

With that caveat,

Eisenschiml initiated one

of the most prolonged debates concerning the assassination
since that event and one that continues in the public mind
today.
Helen Jones Campbell,

author of a book charging that

Mary Surratt had been wrongfully convicted at the trial,
picked up on Eisenschiml’s theory about Stanton in 194-3Stanton’s security measures with respect to the guarding of
the conspirators were not extraordinary— they were
unbelievable.

Hoods were placed over the prisoner’s heads

and they were placed in irons under heavy guard throughout
the trial.

No guard ever patrolled the same spot more than

once, and the p r i s o n e r s were kep t in f u l l v i e w of the
guards at al l times.

After reviewing these procedures and

others like them, Campbell asked the following questions:
’’What was it the Secretary of War feared these men might
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see?

Or hear?

Or tell?

Against what conversation were

they hooded and bound?"11
Campbell reiterated Eisenschiml's theory that Mary
Surratt was executed to keep her from talking about Booth’s
accomplices.

The following is her version:

Bo oth l o v e d the sound of his own voice.
In the Surratt house it was more than
likely he had talked with fervor and
freedom.
Booth had told Herold that
thirty-five men high up in Washington
were helping him. If he had told
Herold, would he not tell the Surratts?
If he told, m ig ht he not h a v e na med
those thirty-five assistants?
Did Mrs.
Surratt know who they were?
There was a
chance.
Campbell suspected that either Stanton did not elicit the
information from Herold concerning the accomplices or had
it destroyed.

She claimed that some War Department clerk

carefully neglected to record ’’who had conversed with
Booth,

who it was that had changed his purpose from capture

to death, who it was that co u l d pro fi t from de at h who coul d
not profit from capture and abduction.” 13
An interesting addition to the Stanton thesis was made
in 1961 with the publication of secret ciphers alle ge dl y
written by Lafayette Baker,
Secret Service.

head of the United States

These ciphers were discovered by Ray Neff,

a Ne w J e r s e y ch em ist and C i v i l War buff, whe n he bought an
old copy of Co lburn’s United Service journal for 1 864.
that volume,

In

Baker had written in cipher that Stanton and

other Union officials were behind the assassination.
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Baker’s writings suggested that he possessed papers which
would implicate those Union officials and that attempts
were made on his life to prevent their revelation.

Neff’s

searches also revealed information which backed up Baker’s
c l a i m s that at t e m p t s were made on his life and that he
possibly died from arsenic poisoning.

Though Baker’s

papers have yet to be found, the ciphers contributed a key
element to Eisensch iml ’s arguments.

Baker wrote that Major

Thomas Eckert arranged the tragic deed,

and this was many

years before anyone else suggested that Eckert was involved.
Significance is thus added to Eisenschiml’s story about
E c k e r t ’s refusal to attend the theater with Lincoln.14
Theodore Roscoe’s The Web of Conspiracy in 1959 picked
up on the Eisenschiml theme as well.

”We know there were

unscrupulous leaders in Washington making a tremendous
underground drive for power,” Roscoe wrote.

He argued that

substituting a body for Booth’s at Garrett’s barn would
have been quite possible.

While contending that the case

surrounding the assassination had not been fully accounted
for by historians,

Roscoe said that ’’when dealing with

powerful and unscrupulous men who would connive at the
murder of a President— with secret agents and hidden
conspirators— with military opportunism and governmental
secrecy— who can say an escape was not rigged,
substitution was impossible?”

15

a
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Other writers on the assassination have not been as
quick to accept Eisenschiml’s approach.

Lloyd Lewis' Myths

After Lincoln argued that strange events like the hasty
autopsy of Booth on April 27th and the midnight burial were
inevitable in such a chaotic situation.

Booth’s midnight

burial was no more than an attempt to prevent further
attacks by Southern fanatics,
of their martyr.16

triggered by a formal burial

George S. Bryan’s The Great American

M y t h , published in 194-0, attacked the Eisenschiml thesis as
well.

Bryan faulted Eisenschiml for claiming that Stanton

delayed on the night of the assassination:

"The whole

suggestion that the Secretary of War was particeps criminis
in the accomplishing of L i nc oln’sdeath,

and that he hoped

to make it p o s s i b l e for Booth to escape befo re a general
17
alarm could be given, is as inapt as it is malicious.”
Bryan argued that Stanton was simply being careful in
dispensing information because he knew of the wild
excitement which prevailed throughout the city.

Further,

Stanton could not have kept Booth’s name secret anyway as
several wire services were sending in independent reports
on the a f f a i r . ^
Other historians concur in the two preceding
interpretations.

Hal Higdon exonerates Stanton of

complicity in The Union vs. Dr. Mu d d .
were not sacrificed to keep them quiet,

Surratt and Mudd
Higdon argues,

but

they were the victims of a vengeful Stanton out to exact
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retribution on those who aided the Confederate cause.
Thus, Stanton’s manipulation of evidence at the trial and
other underhanded dealings were directed towards purely
personal and partisan goals.19

James Bishop’s The Day

Lincoln Was Shot sees a fearful Stanton trying "to stop the
pending assassinations rather than apprehending the
perpetrators."20

As a result,

Stanton’s attempts

to

capture Booth might have seemed lackadaisical.
One of the most recent writers on the assassination,
Thomas R. Turner, also takes exception to the Eisenschiml
thesis.

In Beware the People Weepi ng. Turner suggests that

Eisenschiml

"creates unwarranted doubts" by asking a series

of provocative questions on minor aspects of the affair and
thus "the question oftentimes becomes more important than
the a n s w e r . "21

Turner addressed the question of whether

Stanton delayed in sending out information on Booth the
night of the assassination.

"Rapid and ill-thought-out

dispatches to the newspapers might have had the very effect
on people that Stanton has been accused of fostering
anyway,

of arousing them to frenzy,

especially the

army.

"22

With respect to why Stanton endeavored to cover up the
government’s prior knowledge of plots against Lincoln,
Eisenschiml suggested,

as

Turner claims that the War

Department was simply embarrassed by its failure to foll ow
up on a l l of the re p o r t s bro ught to it e v e r y day in large
numbers.23

Turner also defends Stanton’s concealment of
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Booth’s diary.

He accepts Stanton’s 1867 claim that the

Booth diary was not revealed for use at the trial because
’’there was nothing in the diary which I could conceive
would be testimony against any human being."24Turner are right, of course.

Stanton and

The diary would not have

testified against anyone, rather it would have effectively
exonerated Arnold, McLaughlin,

Surratt, and Mudd since it

paints the assassination as a last-minute decision by
Booth.

Booth wrote in that diary on the 14-th that "until

today nothing was ever thought of sacrificing to our
25
co untry’s wrongs.”
Turner’s major point was that Stanton had not stirred
up anti-Southern sentiment and vengenance after the
assassination.

The North,

in fact, believed that the

Confederate leadership and its symphathizers in the North
(Surratt and Mudd) had something to do with the
assassination.

"Under the circumstances,

that Stanton could have charged

it is not likely

[sic] public opinion if he
26

had wished to,

and admittedly he had no such desire."

Unfortunately,

Turner contradicts himself later in the

book.

After discussing some of the flimsy evidence Stanton

and his underlings had dredged up,

including a cipher used

by Confederate secret agents in Canada, Turner concludes
that "the evidence given about the cipher convinced many
people that there was a connection between Booth and the
Richmond G o v e r n m e n t . "27

jn short,

Stanton played a large
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role in forming public opinion.

When Turner discusses the

perjured evidence manufactured by Stanton to implicate the
conspirators,

he claims that "with the public so persuaded,

it is not unusual that the military commission handed down
the sentences that it did."^8

Turner contradictions do

little to help Stanton’s cause.
The most recent book on the assassination is William
Hanchett’s The Lincoln Murder Conspiracies, published in
1983.

It is a much-needed and thorough attempt to demolish

many of the theories and legends associated with the
assassination.

The Eisenschiml thesis was one of the

targets Hanchett concentrated upon.

Hanchett went far in

pointing out the flawed basis of Eisenschiml’s methodology
and highlighted areas in which that author’s speculations
were groundless.

Yet it is interesting that Hanchett found

it most difficult to eliminate speculation about Stanton
entirely.

The problem consisted of explaining many of

Stanton’s actions within the context of rationality.
Hanchett’s conclusion,

then,

about Stanton was that a study

of the man ought to be u n d e r t a k e n with a v i e w to w ar ds
explaining his actions,

and thus strike the final blo w to

speculations about Stanton's actions.
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Other accounts inv ol vi ng Stanton have appeared from
time to time, but many of them in volv e serious flaws and
historical errors and need not be mentioned here.

This

thesis proposes to extend the debate summarized in this
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chapter and perhaps end the arguments about Stanton’s
complicity forever.

The historians since Eisenschiml have

done a good job of e l i m i n a t i n g some of the minor points
against Stanton, but they have not succeeded in
satisfactorily accounting for Stanton’s behavior generally.
This thesis offers a hypothesis that attempts to understand
Stanton’s actions without charging him with complicity
in the murder of Abraham Lincoln.
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CHAPTER II
STANTON AND THE PARANOID STILE
”It is an indisputable though neglected fact that by
the 1850’s conspiratorial imagery had become a formalized
staple in the political rhetoric of both North and South,
appropriated by eminent statesmen and journalists as well as
by fanatics.””^

Fear,

insecurity,

ways dominated antebellum America.
author of the above quotation,

and paranoia,

in many

Richard Hofstadter,

and other historians have

found periodic instances of this phenomenon throughout
American history.
Obvious signs of fear and insecurity became apparent
during the antebellum period.

Anti-Masonic and anti-

Catholic movements were symbolic of this fact,

the

political expression of the two being the Anti-Masonic
party and the Know Nothing party.

But the so-called Slave

Power conspiracy of the 1850Ts was the most prominent
indication of such paranoia.

The Slave Power Conspiracy

theory and other conspiratorial fears probably resulted
from ’’anxiety over the problem of preserving a consistent
sense of national identity in the face of rapid social
c h a n g e . ”2

As a result,

image of an ’’expansive,

the evidence suggests that the
subversive force was a means of
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articulating individual and communal anxieties over being
duped and slipping behind" in a rapidly changing w o r l d . 3
The Northern fear of the Slave Power was often
exhibited in Biblical imagery direct from the Book of
Revelation,

the Slave Power being a kind of anti-Christ.

Run by a clique of 350,000 slaveholders,
"organization" was a "giant parasite,
plant,

this

a plague,

a poisonous

a dragon, a monster" to be eliminated at all costs.4

Subtly controlling the nation’s destiny and sapping it of
its moral fiber,

the Slave Power sought to extend its

stranglehold over all the states of the Union.
On the part of Southerners,

the fear of an

abolitionist conspiracy was very real.
societies of Kansas,

for example,

The emigrant aid

"confirmed Southern fears

that abolitionist conspirators had nearly gained control of
the No rt h and w o u l d not stop unti l they had seized the
federal go v e r n m e n t . " 5
too,

The imagery was just as powerful

the societies being described as "dark,

hidden,

and

sly."6
Perhaps it is not surprising,

then,

that out of this

social milieu would arise a Union Secretary of War with an
abiding fear of conspiracy directing against the national
government.

Edwin M. Stanton,

L i n co ln ’s Secretary of War,

displayed several characteristics common to many of his
countrymen.

The Secretary was not unique when considered

in the l i g h t of his e n v i r o n m e n t , one p e r m e a t e d by fear and
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insecurity.

Using Stanton as a typical spokesman for the

conspiratorial mindset of his day, we can better understand
his own actions and those of his peers.
Hofstadter describes the spokesman of this "paranoid
style" as finding such conspiracies "directed against a
nation, a culture, a way of life whose fate affects not
himself alone but millions of others."7

Further

the exposer of conspiracies necessarily
adopts a victimized self-righteous tone
w h i c h ma sks his own m e a n e r interests. . .
accusations of conspiracy conceal or
justify one’s own provocative acts. . .
still worse, they lead to overreactions,
particularly to degrees of suppressive
violence, which normal ly would not be
tolerated.8
Stanton fits this description very well.
Contemporaries found him to be an inveterate believer in
hidden conspiracies and shadowy enemies.
described him as being a harsh,

Also,

they

vindictive opponent of

those he defined as enemies and conspirators against the
Union.

The extent of Stanton’s fear of such conspirators,

acts to a certain extent,

as a barometer for the harshness

and intolerable nature of Stanton’s behavior.

For if the

threat was as widespread, dangerous, and ruthless as
S t a n t o n b e l i e v e d it to be, then it was n e c e s s a r y to tear up
the roots of disloyalty and punish the conspirators so
harshly that they would never do anything similar again.
James G. Blaine, a Radical Republican ally, described
Stanton in the following way:
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The extinction of the Rebellion by
force— that was his task, and no fateful
destiny ever moved more inexorably than
he in its performance.
He could see and
hear and know nothing else; whatever
would help he used, and whatever would
hinder was ruthlessly thrust by. Though
the earth. . .was c o v e r e d wi t h dead men,
he saw them not; though the bosom of the
storm discharged fire and blood and
gobbets of human flesh he seemed
unconscious of it.9
Other contemporaries agree,

to a surprising extent,

the many features of Stanton's personality.
the Navy Gideon Welles,

on

Secretary of

admittedly a political enemy, was

the most perceptive observer of Edwin Stanton.

He

described the War Secretary as filled with panics and
alarms,

often dreading dark and hidden conspiracies.

Moreover, Stanton was a harsh and vindictive man who rarely
let the niceties of law and procedure stand in his way.
Stanton was very energetic, too, and this contributed to
his successful handling of the demanding chores of the War
Department.

This energy,

of course,

could be used in

battering opponents and enemies as well.
Treachery was something nearly everyone saw in Edwin
Stanton, and it a p pears to h a v e been one of his f a v o r i t e
devices for destroying the pervasive rebel conspiracy.
Described as "sly" by one of his biographers,

Stanton often

engaged in behind-the-scenes maneuvering to oust opponents
like General George B. M c C l e l l a n d 0

Polit ical ly moderate

Hugh McCulloch remarked that "Stanton is false and
tr eac her ou s, and. . .a ste ady spy up on a l l of us."

11
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Governor

William Dennison of Ohio,

labelled

Stanton a charlatan,

five

years.*'^

a steadfast Radical,

having known him for

General David Hunter,

twenty-

also in the Radical

Camp, told Salmon Chase that he had seen Stanton but once,
’’and was then so treated that I never desired to see him
again.

[I] think from facts that have come to my knowledge

that he is not

sincere."*'3

General McClellan,

a mortal

enemy of Stanton’s after the Peninsula campaign,

agreed in

vivid language:
I think that he is the most unmitigated
scoundrel I ever knew, heard or read of;
I th ink that had he l i v e d in the time of
the Savior, Judas Iscariot would have
remained a respected member of the
fraternity of the Apostles, and that the
magnificent treachery and rascality of
E. M. Stanton would have caused Judas to
h a v e rai se d his arms in h o l y h or ro r and
unaffected wonder. 4
Everyone agreed as well that Stanton could be cruel
and vengeful towards those he defined as enemies of the
nation.

Perhaps the most impressive feature of

the contemporary views of Stanton, however, is their
striking similarity.

In summary,

one need only read the

description of Stanton’s trusted lieutenant and supporter
General Ethan A. Hitchcock:
My chief is narrow-minded, full of
prejudices, exceedingly violent,
reckless of the rights of others, often
ac t i n g like a w i l d man in the dark,
throwing his arms around, willing to hit
anybody, so he hits somebody, and makes
a big stir.
His idea of energy is
altogether physical.
He is coarse in
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his use of language, and his dislikes
are mere prejudices— not founded upon
any proper knowledge of character or of
the p r o f e s s i o n of w h i c h he is the l e g a l
h e a d . '^
These characterizations of Stanton, as developed in the
following pages,

can be attributed in part to Stanton’s own

personal qualities,

as distinguished from the more

generalized fears of his countrymen.
example,

Whitelaw Reid,

for

was one contemporary observer who attributed

Stanton's "paroxysms of passion" in the War Department to
his poor health.

Reid noted that these outbursts of hate

and anxiety had become more prevalent by 1865 as the chores
of the Department weighed more heavily upon S t a n t o n . ^

The

following comment by Thomas Kirkbride, a psychiatrist,
r e v e a l s the extent to w h i c h the l ab or s of the War
Department may have affected Stanton’s mental

capacity:

"It was v e r y t o u c h i n g to h a v e him t e l l us, as m e d i c a l men,
devoted to brain troubles, how his head was often affected,
after work that no man ought to have u n d e r t a k e n . " 17
Stanton suffered throughout most of his life from a
severe case of asthma.
for days.

Attacks often left him prostrated

When considering Stanton in light of the

paranoid style characteristic of his day,

it should be

n o t e d that his as t h m a may h a v e p l a y e d a major r o l e in
intensifying his anxiety about contemporary events.
Psychiatric researchers have uncovered personality
tendencies

characteristic of asthma patients.

One writer
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has found that ’’personality patterns present in asthma
patients indicate a greater than average incidence of
personality problems.”^

In addition,

asthmatics "showed a

trend toward more anxiety, depression, guilt and disgustshame.”

19

Psychiatric research has found that "intense emotional
states,

such as panic and fear,

accompany acute asthmatic

episodes" and continue in the general personality of the
patient.^0

The patients with severe cases often
present themselves as more depressed. . .
more suspicious and guarded than others,
more likely to feel that their life is
currently more of a burden than others,
more likely to feel alienated from
others, more likely to have a higher
activity level than others and more
likely than other patients to be
socially introverted.21

As the rest of this thesis will demonstrate,
possessed many, if not all,

Stanton

of these characteristics.

The

asthmatic basis for his personality of fear and paranoia
can only be inferred or suggested.
history,

however,

Stanton’s medical

can serve as one explanation for

St an to n’s personality.
Early in the War Secretary’s life,

several instances

of peculiar behavior reflect demonstrable indications of
paranoia and extreme anxiety.

In 1833,

cholera struck

Stanton’s community in Ohio and Ann Howard,
close friends,

one of his

died less than two hours after coming down

with the disease.

She was buried immediately to prevent
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the contagion from spreading.
at lunch,
dead.

Stanton,

who had seen Howard

could not believe, at dinnertime, that she was

"Requesting two young friends to assist him,

he

proceeded to her grave, and, with his life in his hands,
exhumed and opened the casket in order to be sure that she
had not suffered the awful agony of burial alive."22

This

account has not been fully corroborated, however.
The high level of irrational fear and insecurity
demonstrated on that occasion was followed a decade later
by another strange reaction to death.

Stanton's child,

Lucy, died, and Wil li am Stanton Buchanan, a relative,
reported that Stanton,

"after she had been buried about a

year he exhumed the tiny remains, placed the ashes in a
metal box made for that purpose."23

This box he kept in

his room until he buried it a year later with his wife.
The death of his wife in 184-4- threw Stanton into
uncontrollable grief.
"sent his gardener,

One observer wrote that Stanton

Alfred Taylor,

to guard like a soldier

the resting-place of his idolized wife."24

A friend

reported that Stanton at night "would leave his room,
streaming from his eyes, and taking a lamp,
house,

crying over and over

tears

search the

’Where is M a r y . ’"25

Fear and depression, which psychiatrists have found to
be intertwined in asthma patients,
in Stanton's prewar career,
death.

occurred at other times

especially when confronted with

Stanton’s brother committed suicide in 1846 by

u
stabbing himself in the throat.

An observer of that awful

scene recalled the moment:
Edwin M. Stanton came over at once, but
on seeing how terrible the happening
was,
lost self-control and wandered off
into the woods without his hat or coat. . .
Dr. Sinclair, fearing a second suicide,
or d e r e d K n o w and Sam F i l s o n to wa t c h him
every moment.26
W i ll ia m Brown eve ntua lly chased and caught Stanton in his
flight through the woods and Stanton never tried suicide.
The Mexican War provided the future War Secretary another
opportunity to display intense depression.

When the

Steubenville Grays prepared to leave for the war,
drew wills for

them,

"Stanton

or gave advice as to arranging their

personal affairs" in case of death in battle.27
If Stanton’s prewar career exhibited problems with
death,

the onset of the war in 1861 triggered a tremendous

amount of fear and insecurity.
1860,

Beginning in December,

Stanton pleaded with other officials to understand

the potential danger secessionists posed to them personally
and to the country.

A. E. H. Johnson, a f r i e n d l y

subordinate, wrote that Stanton told President James
Buchanan "that the ground was mined all around and under
him, ready to explode, and, without prompt and energetic
action, he w o u l d be the l a s t P r e s i d e n t of the U n i t e d
po

States."
Stanton’s preoccupation with secessionist intrigue was
quite remarkable and exceeded that displayed by any other
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high Union official.

Hyman and Thomas1 account of a meeting

between Charles Sumner and Stanton on January 25, 1861 is
graphic:
Stanton drew Sumner into his office.
Then glancing around at the clerks, he
took him through six different rooms and
finding them all occupied, finally led
him into the entry.
'He told me that he
was surrounded by secessionists— who
w o u l d r e p o r t in an hour to the
newspapers any interview between us—
that he must see me at some other time
and pl ace — that everything was bad as
could be.29
At about the same time, Stanton assured Salmon Chase that
"while companies of armed men were indeed nightly drilling
in the city and were 'ready at a signal to overthrow the
government' the President did not believe there was
d an ge r."30
By June,

1861,

Stanton was very afraid, writing an old

f rien d in Ohio that he c o u l d not l e a v e his home in
Washington "with the enemy still at our gates."31

Yet he

saved his principal fears for his tenure as Secretary of
War.

One rigid policy of the War Department under his

leadership was to prohibit Northern-born Southerners from
fleeing the Confederacy into Union lines.

The reason for

this was that a l l of these p e o p l e were the "very wo rst
traitors and spies we have in the Northern states."

Nearly

every one "permitted to come North is now acting the part
of copperhead and traitor and the women are the worst of
a l l .

"32

Stanton was overly concerned with possible

4.6
agitators and infiltrators,

as he believed that a

treasonable conspiracy conceived at the 1860 Charleston
convention "existed to take over the North rather than
►

merely remove the South from the Union."33

Stanton’s

countrymen shared this particular fear with him, as
evidenced later by exotic accounts of the Copperhead
movement.
March, 1862 brought a terrified outburst from Stanton
during the Merrimac incident.

In the hours after the

Mer rim ac’s attack on the Union fleet in Hampton Roads,
Lincoln met with his Cabinet.

At this meeting,

Stanton

predicted that the Merrimac would destroy every Union naval
v e s s e l and "go to Ne w Yo rk and Bo s t o n and d e s t r o y those
cities,

or lev y from them contributions sufficient to carry

on the w a r . "34-

Gideon Welles,

at whom Stanton raved for

allowing such a disaster to happen,

described the scene

v i vid ly :
There was throughout the whole day
something inexpressibly ludicrous in the
wild, frantic talk, action, and rage of
Stanton as he ran from room to room, sat
down and jumped up after writing a few
words, swung his arms, scolded and raved
. . . Bo th he [Lincoln] and S t a n t o n went
repeatedly to the window and looked down
the Potomac. . .to see if the K e r r i m a c
was not coming to Washington.-^
O rv ille Browning relates the Secretary’s novel and
truly ludicrous solution to the Merrimac problem:
me that he had.

"He told

. .30 canal boats loading with stone to be

sunk in the channel of the river."36

Lincoln later
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facetiously referred to this group of boats resting idly at
the Potomac’s edge as ’’Stanton’s Navy.”

Stanton even

telegraphed New York for the immediate construction of an
i r o n c l a d at w h a t e v e r cost to run dow n and sink the
Merrimac,

though one was already under construction.

W e l l e s ’s assurances during the day that the Merrimac did
not have the ability to leave Hampton Roads did little to
assuage the War Secretary.

It is perhaps fortunate for the

Union Navy and Potomac River navigation that Welles was in
charge of naval affairs,

instead of the ’’fearfully

stampeded Stanton,” as John Hay described him.

37

Other occurrences of a similar nature affected Stanton
in the same way.

On the morning of August 30,

1862,

Stanton received word that General John Pope was wrapping
up a victory on the battlefield of Second Manassas.
Nevertheless,

he had the more important papers in the War

Department gathered into bundles, ready to be carted to
safety.

Moreover,

the Secretary ordered the arms and

ammunition in the Wshington arsenal shipped to New York as
soon as possible.38

^he fact that Stanton issued these

orders while thinking Pope had won may be less remarkable
than the fact that the munitions were essential for the
defense of the capital.
Fear could also get in the way of logical decision
making.

On June 30,

1863,

Stanton sent a dispatch to Chief

of Staff Henry Halleck to ’’see that every possible means of

4-8

security is adopted against any sudden raid or incursion of
the enemy,

by day or by night.”

Stanton suggested that

increased security could be had by planting batteries along
the roads to and within Washington.^9

H a l l e c k ’s answer

reflected the sheer irrationality of the suggestion,

noting

the elaborate fortifications and artillery positions
already in place:

”1 know of no military officer who would

approve of such a disposition. "4-0
One minor i n s tance in the f a l l of 1863 exhibits the
panic which could sweep over Stanton’s personality at any
moment.

Travel lin g west to confer with Grant, Stanton

stopped at a Tennessee hotel,

the arranged meeting place.

Though nothing of military importance was occurring,
Stanton became excited upon not finding Grant at the hotel.
In Grant’s words,

"finding that I was out,

nervous and excited,

he became

inquiring of every person he met—

including guests of the house— whether they knew where I
was, and bidding them find m e . " ^
Other isolated instances exhibit panic reactions on
the part of the Secretary.

When John Yates Beall and

others captured The Philo Parsons on Lake Erie in
September,

1864, Stanton erupted.

We lle s wrote that the

Secretary feared "all our vast shipping on the Lakes was at
its mercy."

That he overstated the problem posed by this

merchant vessel was obvious to Welles, who wrote in his
diary that Stanton was "always in an excited panic,

a
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sensational condition,
Stanton’s character,

at such t i m e s . T h e

however is such that not every

critical event' would set off a panic reaction.
instance,

complexity of

For

in July of 1864* when Jubal E a r l y ’s raid on the

capital posed the greatest threat to the city since First
Manassas,

Stanton approached the situation soberly.

In

fact, he did so to an e x ten t that W e l l e s f e l t compelled, to
comment on it.43

Perhaps,

however,

such instances could be

explained by attributing them to depression on Stanton’s
part

(one characteristic found in severe asthmatics),

which

made disaster often seem inevitable.
Stanton’s paranoia was most evident with respect to
his personal safety.

This became especially apparent

toward the end of the war.

John Hay and President Lincoln,

for example, were surprised one October night in 1864 when
they arrived at the War Department and found that building
"in a state of preparation for siege,” it being impossible
even to send a card to Stanton.4-4

A remarkable message

from General Grant to the Secretary in March,

186$, reveals

the extent to which Stanton felt insecure, both about
himself and the city of Washington.

Grant ’s dispatch

questioned whether ’’there was not a great mistake made in
keeping a large number of Cavalrymen posted through the
city of Washington.”

He went on to comment that at least

half the cavalry in the district of Washington was being
wasted in duties "in no way tending to the protection of
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the place.”

Grant assured Stanton that there was not the

slightest need for apprehension,

that ”there is not the

slightest danger of the enemy attempting to cross the
P o tom ac .”45
The events of April, 186$, only served to redouble
Stantonfs fear of being assassinated by the great,

hidden,

treacherous conspiracy that he had fought so hard for four
years.

He obviously feared that, as a consistent and

unbending foe,

he was targeted for death.

General Sherman

learned from his brother Senator John Sherman, a neighbor
of Stanton’s, that Stanton had been frightened by the
assassination.

When the general appeared at Stanton’s

house a month after the assassination,

he found a strong

military guard around it and the houses of other prominent
officials.

”A sense of insecurity pervaded Washington,

for

which no reason existed.
Just weeks after the assassination,

Stanton ordered

the p r o s e c u t i o n of H or ac e G r e e l e y and the ow ner s of the New
York Tribune for suggesting that a vacancy was about to
occur in the War Office.

Stanton described Gre el ey ’s

editorial remarks as an effort "to incite assassins to
finish their work by murdering me and. . .1 shall not allow
them to have me murdered and escape responsibility without
a struggle for life on my part.”47

Gideon W elles was privy

to many of Stanton’s irrational comments in Cabinet
meetings and described him at this time as "full of
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apprehension and stories and plots and

conspiracies."^

As

late as A ug ust 1 8, 1 865, W e l l e s wrot e in his di ar y that
Stanton had a guard around his house and rarely ventured
out without a stout man to accompany him.

In addition,

Stanton sought to impose his fears on President Andrew
Johnson, bringing forward "singular papers relating to
conspiracies,

and dark and murderous designs in which he

had evident faith. "4-9
Clearly,

Stanton felt that rebel conspirators and

their allies surrounded him,

even after the war was over.

He also overestimated their potential power, as is revealed
in Grant’s March,

1865 dispatch.

These two facts led the

War Secretary to be intensely secretive in all of his
actions.
point.

The treatment of state prisoners is a case in
When Samuel Bowles,

a leader implicated in

treasonous activities in the Northwest, was arrested, he
was not o n l y p l a c e d in irons but his guards were ordered to
"take every precaution necessary to prevent escape or
r e s c u e . "50

This dispatch,

orders of this kind,
rescue.

typical for War Department

reveals an inordinate concern with

Considering the strict security with which such

prisoners were kept,
with rescue.

only a paranoiac would be concerned

Even Jefferson D a v i s 1 private secretary,

Burton Harrison,

was prevented "from having communication,

ve r ba ll y or in writing, with any person whomsoever, without
permission from this D e p a r t m e n t . "51

Again,

in Harrison’s
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case, the war was over.

Apparently,

the powerful hidden

conspiracy remained potent in Stanton's mind,

enough to

stage rescues behind Union lines.
With potent conspirators still at large,
was indispensable.

The arrival of the captured Confederate

President at Fort Monroe in May,
example.

1865,

provides a good

In a conference with Grant and Welles, Stanton

urged them to tell no one of Davis' arrival.
no word could get abroad.

a

s

s

.

"Stanton said

He had the telegraph in his own

hands and could suppress everything.
p

secretiveness

Not a word should

The interrogation of the conspirators and others

in vol ved in the assassination of Lincoln was also highly
secretive.

Stanton chastised Provost Marshal MacPhail of

Baltimore for allowing "an examination of Samuel Arnold to
be taken and made known to any one, before it was reported
to this

Department.

"53

Subordinates were allowed little

freedom and all information gathered had to be given to the
Secretary before the case against the conspirators
proceeded f u r t h e r . 54-

Of course,

Mary Surratt and her

f ello w prisoners were not allowed to speak without
permission.
Stanton revealed his secretiveness in other ways.

He

told one subordinate that certain men could not be trusted,
and that he watched and studied everybody.
could lead to absurd extremes.

This distrust

Stanton's hold on the

telegraph system was so tight and jealously guarded that he
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fired an operator in Tennessee upon learning that the
officer had turned over, on direct orders, the telegraph
key to the Commanding General of Union Armies, Ulysses S.
Grant.55

In addition,

War Department papers were so

confidential that they had to be hidden from other
government officers.

In August,

1866, Attorney General

Hugh M c C u ll oc h received a letter informing him that Stanton
had abstracted important papers from the War Department and
had hidden them at the Soldiers H o m e . 56

During his famous

struggle with President Johnson, the War Secretary
instructed his subordinate,

A. E. H. Johnson,

to store the

telegraphic record in a vault in Ford's Theatre and hide
the key.^^
A remarkable manifestation of Stanton's suspiciousness
was his belief that the Slave Power conspiracy had
infiltrated the Union Army high command.

In Stanton's

mind, personal and political enemies quickly became
traitors to the Union.

His friend Blaine freely wrote in

his memoirs of Stanton's penchant for accusing loyal
officers of treasonous activity:

"He was subject to

unaccountable and violent prejudice,

and under its sway.

. .

many officers of merit and of spotless fame fe ll under his
ro

displeasure and were deeply wronged by him."
The treatment accorded Colonel Charles F. Stone after
the disaster at Ball's Bluff in October,
pattern of injustice.

1861, set the

After Stanton had Stone arrested for
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a l l eg edly allowing personal mail from secessionists to pass
through his lines, he rejected a military trial for Stone’s
case.

Instead, he let Stone take a beating before the

Committee on the Conduct of the War,

whose meetngs were

held in secret and controlled by Radical Republicans.
Stone was not a l l o w e d to hear the charges a g ai ns t him and
never stood a chance against his Radical accusers on the
Committee.59

Stone languished in prison for an extended

period of time without any finding of guilt.

Stanton let

this happen because he prejudged Stone to have been engaged
in traitorous actions.
inflicted on Stone,

When asked about the injustices

Stanton replied coolly:

’’Individuals

are nothing; we are contributing thousands of them to save
the Union. ”60
The case of General George B. M c C l e l l a n is a
celebrated one.

T. Harry Williams has constructed a

convincing argument that Radicals in Washington,

including

Stanton, wanted M c C l e l l a n to fail during the Peninsula
campaign because they feared that his success might lead to
a Presidential bid (McClellan being a moderate Democrat).
To that end,

General Irvin McDowell,

more in line with

Radical ideology, was given a separate command and crucial
forces were withheld from M c C l e l l a n to cripple his
effectiveness.

McDowe ll told Major General Will ia m B.

Franklin as much at the time.
accuracy of W i l l i a m s ’ argument,

Whatever the extent of the
one point he makes is
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completely true:

"the radicals sincerely believed that

M c C l e l l a n was a traitor."61

Again,

political enemies were

considered ipso facto traitors.
Stanton led his colleagues in holding these beliefs.
Secretary of the Treasury Salmon Chase wrote in his diary'
that Stanton had believed for some time that M c C l e l l a n
"ought not to be trusted with the command of any army in
the U n i o n . C l o s e r

examination of Stanton’s attitude

toward M c C l e l l a n makes it apparent that the Secretary
believed M c C l e l l a n was a Southern sympathizer.

Browning

noted that Stanton "said that he did not think M c C l e l l a n
could emancipate himself from the influence of Jeff Davis,
and fe a r e d that he was not w i l l i n g to do any thing
calculated greatly to damage the cause of secession."6.3
Stanton picked up this fear from rumors that Jefferson
Davis had initiated M c C l e l l a n into the Knights of the
Golden Circle before the war.

The Knights of the Golden

Circle was a highly secretive organization believed to have
been in league with Southern secessionists.

That M c C l e l l a n

was a traitor in Stanton’s mind is clear from a letter to
an old friend in Ohio in November,

1862, which described

McClellan and his friends as "enemies of the country."*^
In many ways,

it was M c C l e l l a n ’s incompetence and

failure which Stanton consistently pointed to when speaking
of the ge n e r a l ’s treason.

The Secretary could easily have

said what Senator Joseph McCarthy said during the Korean
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War in 1951,

further demonstrating the conspiracy and

paranoia link throughout American history:
How can we account for our present
situation unless we believe that men
high in this government are concerting
to deliver us to disaster?
This must be
the p r o d u c t of a great conspiracy. . .
What can be made of this unbroken series
of decisions and acts contributing to
the strategy of defeat?
They cannot be
a t t r i b u t e d to inc ompetence. . . .The
laws of probability would dictate that
part of. . .the decisions would serve
this count ry’s interest.6$
General Robert Milroy suffered in this way when his command
was captured during L e e ’s advance into Pennsylvania in
June,

1863.

Upon learning of the capture,

Stanton remarked

to several officers in the War Office that Milroy had not
seen a fight or an enemy before surrendering.

This came in

spite of the fact that an officer from the scene had just
told Stanton differently.

Observer Welles wondered why the

Secretary ’’wished to misrepresent and belittle

M i l roy. ”66

General Wi llia m S. Rosecrans faced similar accusations
after the Battle of Chickamauga.

John Hay reported in his

diary that while telegraph operators were deciphering the
first news of Roscrans' defeat,
own judgment:

Stanton burst out with his

”1 know the reasons well enough.

ran away from his fighting men.

Rosecrans

. .He (McC— ) and C—

both

made pretty good time away from the fight to Chattanooga,
but Rosecrans beat them both. ”67
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Perhaps it should be mentioned in connection with
Rosecrans the allegation that Stanton was vi olent ly antiCatholic.

Knowing as we do the social milieu from which

Stanton came, the charge is hardly exceptional.

Catholicism

was v i e w e d as a great c o n s p i r a c y by m a n y in the 19th
century,

perhaps second only to the Slave Power as a

dangerous force sapping the strength of the Republic.
Catholics were pawns of the Pope, an anti-democratic
manipulator of a world-wide network.

The Republican Party

gained much of its strength from those who displayed violent
nativistic sentiments just before the war,
being one such sentiment.

anti-Catholicism

Though Stanton was not a formal

member of the Republican Party, he shared many of its
views.

It would not be surprising if he saw Catholics

linking their conspiratorial aims with those of the rebels,
thus making the treasonous conspiracy against the Union all
the more hideous.
General Rosecrans was a Catholic and his orderly,
J. Patton,

M.

has written that his superior was refused more

men and then relieved after Chickamauga because Stanton
feared that a Rosecrans victory could make him the first
Catholic president.

Patton relates a conversation between

Stanton, Halleck, and a Colonel Moose in which Stanton and
Hal leck disapproved of ntoo many priests” around Rosecrans
and that f,it w o u l d be bet te r to h a v e a d e f e a t tha n h a v e a
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Catholic President ."^8

Corroboration is scarce on this,

however.
Another general wronged by Stanton was General
Sherman, whom the Secretary thought to have designs upon
the government

(again,

Sherman was a moderate).

When

Sherman submitted his initial agrement with General Joseph
Johnston in April,

1865,

for the latter's surrender,

St an to n and the Ca b i n e t f e l t that it had gone b eyo nd mere
military questions.
was inexcusable.

Stanton’s official response,

however,

Releasing to the press the information

that the agreement had been disapproved,

Stanton included

only the first part of Grant’s dispatch discussing the
problems with the agreement.

He omitted the last part

explaining why Sherman had granted Johnston such favorable
terms.

In addition,

Stanton's own dispatches to the press

indicated that the faulty agreement had given Jefferson
Davis time to e s c a p e . S h e r m a n

rightly protested this

action to Grant, claiming that it had ’’invited the dogs of
the press to let loose upon me . "70
But that was not all.

Stanton had Halleck send

Generals Meade, Sheridan, Wright, Wilson and others orders
"to pay no regard to any truce or orders of General Sherman
respecting hostilities."71
from command.

Sherman was effectively removed

Why did this happen?

The word traitor

again made an appearance,

and Stanton was the primary

initiator of the attack.

It appears he believed that a
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loyal officer was i n v ol ved in treasonous actions,
though the war was ending.
"prompted by Stanton.

even

Welles wrote that Speed,

. .expressed his fears that Sherman

at the head of his victorious legions had designs upon the
go v e r n m e n t ."72

Since Stanton felt that moderates were at

least soft on rebels if not in league with them,
ShermanTs loyalty came easily for Stanton.

slighting

Again,

the fear

of conspiracy remained the basis for the Secretary’s
a c tio ns .
If Stanton’s implication of loyal Union officers in the
rebel conspiracy was appalling,

surely his attitude that

President Johnson had traitorous tendencies was worse.
Much of the treachery attributed to Stanton’s actions as a
Cabinet officer can be traced to a fear of conspiracies and
hidden deals on behalf of Southern traitors.
Miller,
written,

As Alphonse

a biographer of Radical Thaddeus Stevens, has
Stanton managed ”to reconcile patriotism to his

country with treachery to his superior officer."73
Biographers Thomas and Hyman have accurately interpreted
this tendency as resulting from Stanton’s belief that
Johnson "was Jeff Davis in another
December,

1866,

f o r m . "74

In fact,

by

Stanton feared that President Johnson

himself "might lead a revolutionary movement to use the
Army for the purpose of unseating the Republican
congressional majority."

75
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Treachery was just one way that Stanton could attack
and defeat the Slave Power conspirators, which, in his
mind, continued to beset him and the country long after the
war.

Stanton's biographers have written that when faced

with the very survival of the Union, he "would not have
scrupled to employ d e c e i t . F o r

several years, Welles

had been obsessed with Stanton’s deceitful ways, always
claiming that the Secretary was "an intriguer,

courts

favor, is not f a i t h f u l in his fr ie nds hip s, and is g i v e n to
secret underhand combinations."77

Wel les also claimed that

Stanton had Johnson surrounded most of the time by his
detectives,

or men connected with the military service who

were "creatures of the War Department."

Thus

obtained Johnson’s confidential conversations,
he could detect treason without delay.

Stanton
so that
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By the end of 1865> Stanton was openly working against
the President.

His eloquent denunciation of the Tenure of

Office Act in a Ca bin et m e e t i n g in e a r l y 1 867 se emed comic
to Welles.
interesting:

What Stanton said during that meeting is very
"He protested with ostentatious vehemence

that any ma n who w o u l d r e t a i n his seat in the C a bi ne t as an
a d v i s e r w h e n his a d v i c e was not w a n t e d was un fit for the
place.

He would not,

he said,

remain a moment."79

y et a

few months later he would invoke the same statute to stay
in office.

The ludicrious spectacle of the War Secretary

barricading himself in the War Department in defiance of
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Johnson shows the extent to which he believed himself to be
beset by the minions of the Slave Power conspiracy even as
late as 1867.
It also showed the extent to which Stanton could
display atrocious duplicity.

To understand the true depth

of Stanton's insincerity, one must return to the case of
General McClellan.

Stanton began his efforts to remove

M c C l e l l a n sometime in February,

1862.

Failing initially,

Stanton tried sending General Burnside to the Peninsula to
act as second-in-command, in "reality to control him
[McClellan] ."80

Then he offered command of the Army of the

Potomac to General Ethan Hitchcock, who refused.

Still,

Stanton sent periodic reassurances of support to McClellan,
many of which were believed by that officer until June,
1862.

The following, written in early July, is a good

example:

"there is no cause in my heart or conduct for the

cloud that wicked men have raised between us for their own
base and selfish purposes.

No man had ever a truer friend

than I h a v e be en to you and s h a l l co nt in ue to be."81

Even

more ironic was Stanton's earnest restraint of Senator Zach
Chandler when that person was attacking M c C l e l l a n in early
July:

"that while the campaign was in active progress,

there was yet some hope of a change for the better,

and that

to destroy confidence in a commanding officer under such
circumstances might injure the army in the field."
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If Stanton’s charcteristic deceitfulness was related
to his all-consuming desire to fight the great conspiracy
with whatever means were available,
penchant for usurping power.

then so too was his

Grant recorded in his memoirs

that Stanton -had a "natural disposition to assume all power
and control in ail matters that he had anything whatever to
do with."8.3

Stanton often defied the President or usurped

the powers of his office,

generally when he believed

Lincoln was being too lenient towards those who obstructed
the goal of Union victory.
By 1863, for ex am ple , L i n c o l n had a g re ed to let
Stanton review al l of his requests for pardons before
issuing any of them.

While Lincoln was fond of making light

of the Secretary’s defiance,

Stanton assumed many of the

functions of L i ncol n’s office to a dangerous extent.

As

Grant remarked after the war, the Secretary felt no
hesitation in assuming the duties of the Executive, or
acting without consultation with Lincoln.
we have already seen,

To this end, as

Stanton offered command of the Army

of the Potomac to Hitchcock without consulting Lincoln.
M c C l e l l a n even wrote after the war that Stanton "often
advocated the propriety of my seizing the government and
taking affairs into my own hands" (early in 1862).84-

So

much contempt for L i n c o l n ’s authority did Stanton have that
when criticized for working behind the President’s back for
M c C l e l l a n ’s removal,

he blurted out that "he knew of no
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particular obligations he was under to the President.”
In that comment,
commitment,

one grasps the essence of Stanton’s

which was not to the President,

defeat of the great rebel conspiracy.
hinder him as Hitchcock remarked,

but to the

Whatever would

was ruthlessly thrust

aside.
While grasping for the power of others,

Stanton also

abused much of the power he rightfully possessed.

Again,

it was directed at suspected enemies of the state.

When

faced with the possibility that Maryland might reject an
abolition policy in 1864-, Stanton used army troops to
intimidate the opposition at the polls.

They were

stationed at the polling places to keep tabs on the voting
habits of each voter,
were used.

easy enough when color-coded ballots

Biographer Hyman credits skillful maneuvers of

this kind with the Administration party winning eighteen
seats in the House elections of the fall of

1862.^6

Stanton also took the lead in punishing newspapers or
alleged conspiratorial activity.

On February 10, 1862,

Stanton ordered Dr. Ma l c o l m Ives of the New York Herald to
be arrested ’’and held in close custody. . .as a spy” for
interrupting a War Department co nf er en ce.^

Note that he

was not arrested for violating Department restrictions,
as a spy (the paranoia is clearly evident).

but

A month later,

he suppressed the Washington Sunday Chronicle for reporting
troop movements,

directing that all persons connected with
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the paper,

including its compositors,

be arrested.88

Note

that Stanton ordered all of the laborers connected with the
paper arrested, as if a widespread, pervasive conspiracy
existed.
A classic example of this same paranoia occurred in
May,

1864., when the New York W o r l d , an opposition paper,

published a forged Presidential proclamation,

calling for

more troops, which the editors believed to be genuine.
Stanton’s orders to General Dix to close the paper down
declared that the proclamation had been ’’wickedly and
traitorously.

. .published with the design to give aid and

comfort to the enemies of the United States.”^9
addition,

jn

Stanton jumped to the conclusion that the

telegraph company had planned the affair and had all its
employees thrown in jail.

No real evidence ever existed to

corroborate such wild hallucinations, highlighting
St an to n’s intense fear of conspiracy and treason.
Another way in which Stanton abused his power
demonstrates the extent to which he believed that the Slave
Power had a firm grip on every aspect of society.

On

November 30, 1863> Stanton ordered that ’’all houses of
worship belonging to the Methodist Episcopal Church South
in which a loyal minister,

appointed by a loyal bishop of

said Church, does not now officiate, are placed at the
disposal

of the Right Rev. Bishop Ames.”90

Instructions

w e r e g i v e n as to their l i s t i n g and the f i n d i n g of
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replacements.
Stanton,

This latter process caused some problems for

for in March,

186-4, Bishop Edwards and others of

the United Brethren Church protested Ame s’ "monopoly of
churches.

. .and seemed to have a hankering after a share

of the p l u n d e r ."91

Lincoln,

in this case,

sent a curt note

to Stanton disapproving of his unauthorized policy,

saying

the government could not undertake to run the churches.

92

Stanton continued the policy anyway.
Stanton no doubt believed that the Southern churches
were one of the p r i m a r y so urc es of the S l a v e Powe r
conspiracy and needed to be cleansed of traitorous clergy.
For those individuals against whom was brought some
specific charge of disloyalty,
penalities.

Stanton advised severe

As Hyman has noted,

"the internal security

problem was deadly serious and intensely personal" for
S t a n t o n . 93

Unfortunately, disloyalty was defined within

bounds of what some contemporaries labelled Stanton’s
violent prejudices,

hastily formed and frequently unjust.

W el le s wrote that Stanton was a Radical sensationalist,
"ready to b e l i e v e a n y t h i n g bad of those to wh om he is
opposed."94-

Stanton’s strong actions against those

accused

of be i n g d i s l o y a l must be seen in the l i g h t of his p e r s o n a l
hatred of those in vol ved in the conspiracy.

Also,

the fact

that the conspiracy was much more widespread to Stanton
than to others seemed to call for harsher penalties and
greater deterrence.
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His reaction to a Coles County, Ohio, riot in 1862 is
typical:

"Every damned one of them [rioters] should be

h u n g . "95

On another occasion,

when General Dix reported

that a c e r t a i n U n i o n spy named W o o d had f a i l e d to ap p e a r at
his headquarters as ordered,
reply:

Stanton sent the following

"You should have sent Wood to the guard house.

W h e n yo u th ink an y man d e s e r v e s it shoot him on the
spot."96

This kind of harsh treatment extended to

St an to n’s treatment of Southern prisoners.
While Stanton often cut rations for the prisoners in
so-called retaliation for the treatment of Union prisoners
in the South, he also restricted rations for another
reason.

On February 15>

1864, Stanton issued orders that

no food would be allowed the prisoners from sources other
than the government

issue

(i.e.,

sutlers,

friends,

etc.),

an act which caused needless outbreaks of scurvy and other
diseases.

The ostensible reason was that such activity

"gives opportunity for sympathizers to show their interest
in rebels."
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Stanton wanted to suppress such interest and leniency,
for it encouraged the great conspiracy.

Attorney General

Bates writes of one instance in which Stanton opposed
letting courts decide the ownership of confiscated Southern
property,

as required by law.

Speaking with Bates about

it, S t an ton a rg u e d that a judge c o u l d not giv e p r o p e r t y to
a rebel,

so no cases should be heard.

Bates’ rejoinder
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that rebels could only be identified in courtroom
proceedings infuriated Stanton:

r,He resumed (rather in

furore) if the Judge s h o u l d g i v e lan d to a t r a i t o r he ought
to be shot and I would give the

o r d e r .

”98

The Secretary also engaged in widespread efforts to '
round up traitors and bring them to account for their
activities.

Arrests were widespread (as was the

conspiracy) and arbitrary, especially in the period after
the assassination.
instructive.

Stanton’s dispatches in April,

1865 are

On April 21, 1865, for instance, Stanton

seems to have targeted the wife of Confederate General
Richard Ewell whom he personally ordered arrested in
N a s h v i l l e . 99

Junius Booth was arrested by the War

Department for no other reason than that he was a relative
of the assassin,
Gayle,

and thus probable conspirator.

George

a respected Alabama politician, was arrested in

April for a l l e gedl y inciting the murder of Lincoln in an
Alabama publication.

He and Booth were not released until

the end of J u n e . ^ ^
Not only do Stanton’s irrational arrests testify to
the terror which he felt over the pervasive, widespread
conspiracy, but his continued efforts after the trial of
the Lincoln conspirators illustrate his belief that it was
not yet dead.

As late as June 15,

1865,

Stanton persuaded

the President to agree to a new order directing the
Military Governor of the District of Columbia to
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arrest, examine, or hold in custody any
person or persons in your command
against whom you may have evidence or
reasonable grounds of suspicion of
treasonlike acts or correspondence with.
enemies of the United States.101

. .

Writing letters south, it seemed, was too conspiratorial
even after the end of hostilities.

Stanton also came close

to instituting executions as a first blow towards
reconstruction,

according to Radical Charles Sumner.

Sumner wrote John Bright in England that "it was Stanton who
wished to hang three or four in a state; I think even he is
*
+
more moderate
now."n 1 0 2

As is apparent, punishment for rebels in the years
after the war was not unusual,

for Stanton believed that

the conspiracy continued to be potent.

It is a fact that

Stanton deliberately withheld a telegram from General
Absalom Baird in New Orleans in 1866 which asked Johnson
for advice concerning the possibility of violence following
a Union meeting.

When a riot subsequently occurred,

Stanton immediately "in great excitement, repeatedly spoke
of the A t t o r n e y G e n e r a l of L o u i s i a n a and the M a y o r of New
Orleans as pardoned rebels who had instigated the murder of
the p e o p l e in the stree ts of the city, that they are g u i l t y
of this terrible b l o o d l et ti ng ."^^

Quite probably, Stanton

was willing to sacrifice innocent lives to place odium on
the "rebels" in Louisiana.

In the same year,

Stanton

opposed efforts to provide protection for the people of
Texas from Indian attacks.

Wel les saw a "lurking
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inclination on his

[Stanton’s] part to slight Texas to permit

the people to be harassed— that spirit of Radical hate and
o p p r e s s i o n . 04

More correctly,

Welles could have seen it

as an unwillingness on the part of Stanton to show kindness
for rebels, or be l e n i e n t in ways which might gi ve new life
to the rebel conspiracy.
As seen in the preceding pages,
displays an overall theme:
this fear arose hate,

Stanton’s personality

the fear of conspiracy.

secrecy,

Out of

vindictiveness, deceit,

arbitrary grasping for power, and general distrust of
almost everyone.

Thus,

the many facets of the Secretary’s

personality relate to the whole.

While many of his

characteristics can be found in other strong Unionists of
the day,

who also feared the pervasive conspiracy,

exhibited them to a greater degree.

Stanton

This is reflected in

the comment of fe l l o w Radicals related in this chapter.
Also, the Secretary’s fears may have developed partially
out of personal factors,

asthma merely being one of them.

This chapter has shown the abiding and deep-rooted fears
that encompassed Stanton’s personality.

In part,

understandable given the context of the war.

they were

More than

that, however, they were exceptional and unique as well.
The preceding development of the Secretary’s ’’paranoidstyle ” personality permits us to examine his strange and
suspicious actions after the assassination in the light of
that unique personality.

NOTES TO CHAPTER II

1. David B. Davis, The Slave Power Conspiracy.
Rouge:
LSU Press, 1 969)>
7^

(Baton

2. David. B. Davis, Editor.
The Fear of Conspiracy.
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1971), p. 1.
3. Davis, The Slave Power Conspiracy, p. 294. I b i d ., p. 74*
5. I b i d ., p . 19*
6. I b i d ., p. 40.
7. Richard Hofstadter, ’’The Paranoid Style in American
Politics,” The Fear of Conspiracy, David B.
Davis, Editor, (Ithaca:
Cornel 1 University
P r e s s , 1971), p. 3•
8. Davis,

The Fear of Conspiracy, p. 361.

9. Frank Flower, Edwin McMasters Stanton. (Akron, Ohio:
Saalfield Publishing,- 1905), p. 4-23.
10. Francis Schruben, ’’Edwin Stanton and Reconstruction,”
23 Tennessee Historical Quarterly 145> 146
(195TT
11. The Diary of Gideon W e l l e s , Howard K. Beale, Editor.
3 volumes.
(New York:
Norton and Company,
1960), III, p. 17.
12. Welles, II, p. 356.
13* Salmon Chase, Diary and Correspondence. (Washington,
D.C.:
Annual Report of the American Historical
Association, 1902), p. 172.
14* Eugene Drozdowski, "Edwin M. Stanton, L i nc ol n’s
Secretary of War," Doctoral Dissertation, Duke
University, 1964* p. 1047.
15- Benjamin Thomas and Harold Hyman, Stanton:
The Life
and Times of Li n c o l n ’s Secretary of W a r .
(New
York:
Alfred A. Knopf, (1962), p. 378.

70

71

16. Ib id ., p. 350.
17. Clifford Farr, !,The Civil War Correspondence of Dr.
Thomas Kirkbride," 83 Pennsylvania Magazine of
History 85, 89 (1959).
18. Nelson Jones, et. al., "Personality Profiles in
Asthma," 32 Journal of Clinical Psychology 284,
285 (1976).
19* Norman Straker, et. al., "Aggression and Childhood
Asthma:
A Study," 18 Journal of Psychosomatic
Research 157, 158 ( 1 9 7 T T
20. Jones, p. 285.
21. Robert Kinsman, et. al., "Levels of Psychological
Experience in Asthma," 36 Journal of Clinical
Psychology 555, 556, 557 (1980).
22. Flower, p. 30.
23. Flower, p. 38.
24- Flower, p. 40.
25. Thomas and Hyman, p. 35.
26. Flower, p. 45.
27. Ib i d ., p. 44*
28. A. E. H. Johnson, "Reminiscences of the Hon. Edwin M.
Stanton," 13 Columbia Historical Society Records
67 (1910), p. 70.
No corroborative evidence
exi sts .
29. Thomas and Hyman, p. 111.
30. Drozdowski, p. 309.
31. John Hay, Letters of John Hay and Extracts From His
D i a r y . V o l u m e I, W a s h i ng to n, D. C., 1908, p.
234.
32. Frank Moore, Official Records of the Union and Confed
erate Ar m i e s . Series II, Volume II, p. 895*
33* Thomas and Hyman, p. 112.
34* Welles,

I, p. 62-3.

72

35. Ibid., p. 65.
36. O r vi lle Browning, Diary, Volume I. (Springfield:
Collections of the Illinois Historical Library,
1927), p. 533.
37. Hay, D i a r y , I, p. 54•
38. Thomas and Hyman, p. 219*
39* OR, Series

I, Volume 27, Part III, p. 4-29*

4-0. I b i d ., p. 4-29*
4-1. Ulysses Grant,
496.

Memoirs.

Volume I.

New York,

1885,

p.

4-2. Welles, Di ar y, II, pp. 152-3.
4-3 • Ib id . , p . 78.
4-4.. Hay, Di a r y , I, p. 234-*
4-5. Grant to Stanton, March 2, 1865, Edwin M. Stanton
Papers, hereinafter Stanton MSS, Library of
Congress.
4.6. William T. Sherman, Mem oi rs . (Boston:
D. Appleton
and Company, 2 volumes, 1875), Volume II, p. 376.
47. Flower, p. 215.
48. Welles,

II, p. 363.

49.

Ib i d ., pp. 363, 424.

50.

Oil, Series II, Volume 8, p.

51.

Stanton to Hancock, May 25,1865, Stanton

52.

Welles II, p. 309.

53.

Stanton to Marshal MacPhail, April 18, 1865,
MSS.

523.
MSS.

Stanton

54- Colonel Alcott to Samuel Cox, Joseph Holt Papers,
Library of Congress.
55. Grant,

II, p.

56. Browning,

36.

II, p. 91.

No other corroboration.

73

57. A. E. H. Johnson, p. 74*
58. James G. Blaine, Twenty Years of Congress.
Henry Bill Publishing, 1884-), P* 5b3 •

(Norwich:

59* Thomas and Hyman, p. 261.
60. Flower, p. 137.
61. T. Harry Williams, Lincoln and the Radicals.
(Madison:
University of Wisconsin Press,
pp. 131-2.

194-1)>

62. Chase, Dia ri es , p. 116.
63. Browning,

I, p. 539*

64..

George Gorham, Life and Public Services of Edwin
Stanton. (Boston:
Houghton Mifflin Company, 2
volumes, 1899)> Volume II, p. 73.

65.

McCarthy quoted in Richard Hofstadter, "The Slave Power
Conspiracy and the Paranoid Style," p. 4-

66. Welles,

I, p. 333*

67. Hay, I, p. 105.
68. Scruben, p. 164*

69.

Thomas and Hyman, p. 411*

70. Sherman,

II, p.

366.

71 . I b i d ., p. 372.
72. Welles,

II, p. 296.

73. Gus Crenson, "Andrew Johnson and Edwin M. Stanton,"
Masters Thesis, Georgetown University, 1949> P«
33.
74-. thomas and Hyman, p. 613*
75. Ibid., p. 493.
76. Ib i d . , p. 115.
77. Welles,

I, p. 203-

78. Ibid.., II, pp. 403-04*

74
79. Ib i d ., III, p. 158.
80. Chase, Diaries , p. 112.
81. Thomas and Hyman, p. 208.
82. Drozdowski, p. 426.
83. Grant,

II, p. 37.

84. Drozdowski,
85. Welles,

p. 426.

I, p. 98.

86. Thomas and Hyman, p. 249*
87. James G. Randall, Lincoln the President, 4
volumes. (New York:
Dodd, Meade, and
1955), IV, p. 37.

Co.,

88. Robert Harper, Lincoln and the Press.
(New York:
McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1951), p. 181.
89. Randall, p. 151.
90. _0R, Series I, Volume 34, Part II, p. 311.
91. Diary of Edward Bates. Howard Beale, Editor.
(Washington, D~. C.:
Annual Report ofthe
American Historical Association, 1930), p. 351.
92. Collected Works of Abraham Li ncoln. Roy Basler,
Editor, 9 volumes.
(New Brunswick:
Rutgers
University Press, 1953), VII, pp. 178-9.
93. Thomas and Hyman, p. 376.
94. Welles,

II, p. 571.

95. Fletcher Pratt, Stanton:
Lincoln's Secretary of W a r .
(Westport, Connecticut:
Greenwood Press, 1953),
p. 223.
96.

OR, Series II, Volume 4, P*

670.

97.

OR, Series II, Volume 6, p.

954*

98. Bates, Di a r y , p. 411•
99* OR, Series II, Volume 8, p. 501.
100.

From _____ to

, June 22, 1985, Stanton MSS.

75

101. Stanton to (illegible), Military Governor of
Washington, June 15, 1865, Stanton MSS.
102. Memoirs and Letters of Charles Sumner. Edward Pierce,
E d i t o r . (New York:
Arno Press, 1969), p. 253.
103. Welles,

II, p. 6U .

104. Welles, II, p. 616..

CHAPTER III
STANTON AND THE ASSASSINATION
With this clear perspective on many aspects of
Stanton's character and personality,

it is possible to

assess the questions raised by many historians with respect
to the Secretary's behavior in the wake of the Lincoln
assassination.

Due to the brief nature of this thesis,

it

is not practical to reach conclusions on every point made
by Eisenschiml and others.

A general view of the prominent

aspects of Stanton's behavior, however, clearly reveals
that his behavior was consistent with that exhibited on
many previous occasions, especially during 1861-1865*
Actions which may have initially struck historians as
strange and suspicious can be understood in the light of
Stanton's personal experience and the political environment
of his time, which spawned similar traits and attitudes
among others striving to save the Union.
Given Secretary of War Stanton's fearful nature,

his

reaction to the assassination of Abraham Lincoln could be
expected to contain paranoiac elements endemic to his three
years in the War Department and perhaps his formative years
in Ohio.

This man believed that spies and traitors had

infiltrated the White House,
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the War Department, and Union
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Army high command,

the churches,

and the newspapers and

swarmed through Washington and its environs.

Wholesale

assassinations were constantly on Stanton’s mind as well, so
muc h so that he f e a r e d the Wh i t e House mi gh t h a v e bee n
mined in January,

1861.

The assassination of Lincoln on April 14, 1865, no
doubt convinced Stanton that his worst-case scenarios had
been correct and that the situation called for decisive
action.

That action contained many of the elements already

discussed with respect to the paranoia in the War
Department— secrecy,

deception,

and vindictiveness.

Decisive action also meant assuming

power and using it harshly,

insecurity,

overreaction,

in order to blunt the seemingly

rekindled flames of rebellion and conspiracy.

For Stanton,

L e e ’s surrender at Appomatox did not end the great
conspiracy;

rather it was alive, active,

still extremelly dangerous.

omnipresent, and

As late as 1867, the Secretary

had fears that President Johnson,

whom he had come to see

as a leading conspirator, might lead a revolutionary
movement of some kind.

Thus,

swift measures were needed

mor e tha n e v e r to s a v e the U n i o n and roo t out the r e m a i n i n g
elements of the great Slave Power plot.
Fear and insecurity were obvious reactions on
Stanton's part,
editorial.

as we noted in his response to Greeley's

Other conspirators and traitors doubtless stood

ready to finish the grisly work Booth had started.

In
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fact,

James Bishop has written that ’’Stanton’s function,

as

he saw it, was to stop the pending assassinations rather
than to apprehend the perpetrators of the Lincoln
shooting.”1

For this reason,

one of Stanton’s prime

concerns became the disposal of Booth’s body.

If Booth was

the mart yr St a n t o n b e l i e v e d him to be, ’’e v e r y hair of
Booth’s head will be a valued relic to sympathizers with the
South in Washington.”2
Stanton ordered a hasty autopsy of Bo oth ’s body on
board the ironclad Montauk and instructed the commanding
o f fic er of the N a v y Yard to ’’h a v e the body p l a c e d in a
strong box,

and deliver it to the charge of Colonel Baker—

the box being carefully sealed.”3

(emphasis mine)

Then

the Secretary ordered Baker to have Booth’s body buried at
a secret place

(the Arsenal grounds) at midnight.

Thus

Stanton rid himself of the danger that sympathizers might
use Bo oth or his ef fe cts as r e l i c s and s y m b o l s to begin
further assassinations or depredations.

The Catholic

imagery (relics and symbols) was an ominous sign of
S t ant on ’s fears.
These same concerns revealed themselves in the
treatment of the Lincoln conspirators,

especially when it

came to the possibility of their rescue by f e l l o w rebel
sympathizers.

Throughout the war, political prisoners had

been kept un d e r h e a v y guard for fear of resc ue by c o 
conspirators in the North.

If the Slave Power organization
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remained intact after Appomattox,

then rescue was a

possibility that Stanton had to foreclose.

Jefferson Davis,

captured May 10, was already being kept under heavy guard
at Fort Monroe,
manacles.
Washington.

including round-the-clock observers and

The conspirators saw it get heavier in
Since even a whisper from Mary Surratt or the

others might ignite attacks or rescue attempts,

hoods were

placed over their heads to prevent conversation.

Each

p r i s o n e r was p l a c e d wi t h i n sight of a guard at a l l times to
protect against the same thing.

When one realizes the

number of men (16,000) surrounding the Arsenal

grounds,

one

realizes the extent of StantonTs fear of rescue.
Secrecy, as throughout the war, was a second hallmark
of Stanton’s reaction.

Only his trusted lieutenants were

allowed to handle certain aspects of the case.

Things were

often hidden from fel low government officials.

The

apprehension of Booth by the Bakers is a good example, and
the intense secretiveness was the probable reason why Booth
was not interrogated as he lay dying at Garrett’s Barn.

We

have seen what such unauthorized action might bring in the
case of Sam Arnold and Marshal l MacPhail of Baltimore.
Stanton controlled all aspects of the government’s response
to the assassination,

as was his custom in similar crises,

and he attempted to make the conspiracy trial secret as
we ll, but failed.

His object w o u l d be to thwart the hi d d e n

enemies that surrounded the War Department and controlled
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the press, preventing them from betraying his actions to
Southern sympathizers.
As mentioned above,

Stanton naturally assumed power in

Washington after Lincoln was shot, and exercised much of
that power for the next several months.
Johnson at the helm,

With an unsure

it was rel atively easy for Stanton to

take control of affairs.

One of his first tasks was to

arrange for a military trial of the conspirators.

Since

Stanton apparently was convinced of their guilt anyway,
this was the surest and quickest way to dispense with them
and get the provocative conspirators out of the public
spotlight.

As Well es wrote,

"I regret they are not tried

by the civil court.

. .but Stanton,

clear and positive,

as emphatic.”4-

courts had been quicker,

who says the proof is
Even if the civil

Stanton no doubt believed that

Slave Power conspirators could connive for acquittal of the
defendants, and possibly lay new rescue plans.
Stanton also believed, however, that Davis and the
Confederate leadership were directly in v ol ve d in the
assassination.

The nature of the vast conspiracy told him

so, and at the least, the Confederate leaders were equally
guilty by their prominent role in carrying out that vast
conspiracy.
April 15th,

In fact,

by five o ’clock on the morning of

Stanton ordered officials along the Canadian

border to arrest Jacob Thompson,
Canada.5

Confederate commissioner to

By the end of April, with the persuasiveness of a

81

true believer, he had convinced most; of the Cabinet that
the assassination was just paTt of the gigantic conpsiracy
which Davis had directed for four years.
Problems began to crop up, however.

The Booth diary

captured on the 26th of April revealed the murder plot to
be a last-minute decision:

"until today nothing was ever

thought of sacrificing to our country’s w r o n g s . ”6

Stanton

concealed this diary during the trial of the conspirators.
When it was revealed in 1867, Stanton v i o l e n t l y opposed its
publication,

for by that time his use of perjured evidence

at the trial had become a great liability.^

He had, on

other occasions, engaged in similar types of legal fraud.
Stanton apparently used doctored evidence during a famous
patent case in 1859>

to deprive Cyrus McCormick of his

g
right to the reaper designThe Secretary did find witnesses w i l l i n g to testify
against Davis and Thompson,
testimony was fraudulent.

but quickly learned that their
He decided to persist in his

efforts, on the assumption that the Confederates must have
had some role in the plot; yet many Radicals like Charles
Sumner openly believed his former Southern colleagues
incapable of such a deed.

In part,

this stemmed from the

Secretary’s belief in the pervasiveness of the great
conspiracy.

Thus,

the absence of a connection to the

Confederate leadership would nearly have been
incomprehensible to Stanton.

If there were no direct
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invol vem ent of Davis and the others, as the leaders of the
Slave Power,

they were responsible for its actions anyway,

and were as guilty as Booth of the murder of Lincoln.
Those who did not understand this would be enlightened if
he could establish the direct connection to the Rebel
leadership.

To this end,

Stanton used the perjured

evidence of Sanford Conover and others in the conspirators’
trial to build his case against Davis.

But when their

testimony leaked to the public, it was quickly proven false
by Jacob Thompson and others, using Canadian hotel records
and other information.
Seymour Frank’s study of this issue has found that the
Secretary used bribes and rewards to construct his story at
the trial.

Moreover, his vendetta aganst Davis continued

into 1866.

Naturally, Stanton and other Radicals did not

believe the Slave Power could be crushed for good until
some form of ’’justice” was dealt its leadership.

Stanton

had Holt actually hire Conover to dig up witnesses against
Davis, even though the man was a known perjurer and liar.
In 1867,

the true dimensions of the witchhunt were

revealed.

Two of Conov er’s witnesses admitted that they

had r e c e i v e d up to $6000 from the War D e p a r t m e n t for their
testimony.

Conover, for his part, felt ’’some consolation

from the fact that several illustrious heads are as deep in
the mud as we are in the mire.”9

It was to prevent these

facts from coming to light in court that Stanton initially
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rejected petitions for John Surratt's extradition to the
United States in 1865-66.10
In addition to his desire to implicate Davis and get
the trial of the conspirators over with quickly,
wanted convictions,

Stanton

as an example of what might happen to

other potential assassins.

Not only was the conspiracy

still alive after Appomattox, but Stanton feared personal
injury enough to have constant bodyguards as late as
August,

1865.

Mary Surratt was the absolute epitome of

what Stanton wanted to punish and discourage.

She

symbolized the Southern sympathizer and Northern traitor,
working behind the lines on behalf of the Slave Power.
Moreover,

she was a Catholic and a woman,- the latter group

described in one of Stanton's dispatches as the worst
internal traitors.

Beyond the fact that a friend claimed

that Stanton did not care for women generally,

Surratt could

be made an example to al l the other females carrying out
the tradition of Rose O'Neal Greenhow,

who worked on behalf

of the conspiracy under the protection of their femininity.11
Surratt lived where at least the kidnapping plot
against Lincoln was hatched and it was plausible to suspect
her of being involved.

But Stanton, an able lawyer,

knew

the evidence against her was insufficient and most probably
non-existent.

Nevertheless,

he got what he needed.

The

Secretary had the cowardly Weichmann frightened into
"remembering" additional facts about the Surratt case.
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Weichmann wrote Assistant Judge Advocate Henry Burnett on
May 5th that "you confused and terrified me so much
yesterday that I was almost unable to say anything."
Weichmann1s testimony,

12

combined with that of the equally

terrified John Lloyd, doomed Mary Surratt.

Again,

fraud

was not out of the q u e s t i o n if r e b e l s and t r a itor s c o u l d be
brought to justice.

It was sad testimony indeed against

Stanton when Weichmann told a friend after the executions
that "it would have been very different with Mrs.

Surratt

if he had been let a l o n e . "13
Conviction was not quite enough for Stanton in his
desire to make Surratt an example.

He probably saw to it

that the military commission’s appeal for a commutation of
Surratt’s death sentence was never seen by President
Johnson,

though there is some dispute on this.

Knowing as

we do Stanton's penchant for controlling everything, it is
likely that he made such efforts through Judge Advocate
Holt.

Surely a Secretary who could defy President Lincoln

at will could engage in keeping information from Johnson.
This coincides with Hyma n’s appraisal,

which noted that the

appeal was omitted from Pitman's official record of the
trial, a fact that Stanton must have k n o w n . 14

General

Augustus V. Kautz, a member of the military commission
observed that "the Judge Advocates,

under the influence of

the Secretary of War, evidently, were very perservering and
wanted to have the seven prisoners all hung."15

Harsh
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punishment for traitors was not new to Stanton and he
apparently felt that anyone conspiring in so dangerous and
heinous a rebellion must deserve the just and prudent
punishment of death.

Too often historians have tried to gloss over the
unpleasant aspects of the Secretary’s behavior,

because it

tarnishes the view we would like to have of Radicals like
Stanton.

But in this case it has undermined our

understanding of the assassination for many years.
Modifying our view of Stanton’s actions and personality has
not sullied the mandate of Union victory,
the images of Booth,

Surratt,

and Mudd.

nor glamorized
It has taught us,

however, how good intentions are often pushed beyond their
rational or justifiable limits and become national
tragedies.

Human behavior often has a dynamic of its own,

and can generate impulses which deny the basic principles
of truth and justice.

While unacceptable,

such impulses

deserve profound contemplation.
In many ways,

our examination of Stanton raises as

many questions as it answers.

For example,

American social and political system,

under the

do those who rise to

power reflect broader currents of psychological phenomena
(in this case paranoia)?

Can we infer from men of

Stanton’s nature that a common psychology exists?

Does the

eventual rejection of these paranoiacs (whether they be the
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extreme Radicals or McCarthyites)

suggest that the paranoid

element is only dominant in times of perceived crises or
danger?

These and other questions, though outside the

scope of this thesis, can be crucial to both the study of
individual and collective psychology in American history,
especially in eras for which there is no polling data.
Perhaps,

then, our interpretive framework for Stanton and

the Lincoln assassination suggests similar lines of inquiry
on a wide variety of topics in American history.

NOTES TO CHAPTER III

1.

James Bishop,

2.

Lloyd Lews, Myths After Li ncoln, p. 220*

3.

Stanton to Commanding Officer of Washington Navy Yard,
April 27, 1865, Stanton MSS.

4-. Welles,

The Day Lincoln Was S h o t , p. 24-4*

II, p. 303.

5.

OR, Series II, Volume 8, p. 4-93.

6.

Osborn Oldroyd, The Assassination

7.

Welles,

8.

Frank Flower,

9.

Seymour Frank, "The Conspiracy to Implicate the
Confederate Leaders," 4-0 Mississippi V alley
Historical Review 629, 648^ 64-9 (1954-) •

10.

Alfred Isaacson, "John Surratt and the Lincoln
Assassination Plot,’ 52 Maryland Historical
Magazine 321, 329 (1957).

11.
12.
13•

of Li nc ol n, p. 93-

III, p. 95.
Edwin McMasters Stant on , p.

64..

F l owe r, p . 51 •
Otto Eisenschiml, Why Was Lincoln Murdered?, p. 280.
I b i d ., p. 281.

14-.

Thomas and Hyman, p. 4-32.

15.

Charles Cooney, "At the Trial of the Lincoln
Conspirators," 12 Civil War Times Illustrated 9,
30 (1973).

87

BIBLIOGRAPHY
A.
1.

PRIMARY SOURCES

Manuscripts

Holt, Joseph.
Library of Congress.
The H o l t Papers are f a s c i n a t i n g in and of
themselves for what they reveal about the Judge
Advoca te ’s investigation of the Lincoln conspirators.
Only moderately useful for this paper, the papers
contain significant information on the attempt to
implicate Jefferson Davis.
Stanton, Edwin McMasters.
Papers.
Library of Congress.
The Stanton papers were generally disappointing
as far as providing information for this paper.
They
seem to be incomplete with respect to communications
of the Secretary himself.
2.

Diaries and Letters

Beale, Howard K., Editor.
Diary of Edward Bates. Annual
Report of the American Historical Association,
Washington, D.C., 1930.
The Bates di a r y was v e r y u s e f u l in this study and
its revelations concerning Stanton are valuable
because they are more spontaneous and distant than
those of Welles.
_______________ . Editor.
Diary of Gideon W e l l e s . 3
volumes.
W. W. Norton and Company, New York, 1960.
The Welles diary is both fascinating and biased.
The author is probably the most perceptive observer in
the Lincoln Cabinet and his comments on Stanton are
illuminating and detailed.
Browning, Orville, Diary. 2 volumes.
Collections of the
Illinois Historical Library, Springfield, 1927.
The Browning diary is similar to the Bates diary
in that its comments on Stanton are more
disinterested, and there are a significant number of
them.

88

89
Chase, Salmon.
Diary and Correspondence.
the American Historical Association,

1902 .

Annual Report of
Washington, D.C.,

The Chase diary is less useful than those already
mentioned but does have some material on Stanton.
Hay, John.
Letters of John Hay and Extracts From His D i a r y .
3 volumes, Washington, D.C., 1908.
The Ha y m a t e r i a l is not u s e f u l for a study of
Stanton as there is little about the War Secretary.

3•

Collected Documents and Papers

Basler, Roy P., Editor.
Collected Works of Abraham
Li n c o l n . Volume VII. Rutgers University Press, New
Brunswick, New Jersey, 1953The works were not ove rly helpful but did provide
a fascinating exchange between the President and
Stanton over the confiscation of Southern churches.
*

Moore, Frank. War of the Rebellion:
The Official Records
of the Union and Confederate Armies. 128 volumes.
Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 18801901

.

The official records provided much useful
information for this thesis, and was especially
helpful concerning the issues of political and
military prisoners, and other War Department
dispatches.
B.
1.

SECONDARY SOURCES

Books

Barzun, Jacques.
Clio and the Doctors.
University of Chicago Press, Chicago,

1974*

Binion, Rudolph.
Soundings:
Psychohistorical and
Psycholiterary. Psychohistory Press, New York, 1981.
_____________________ . Hitler Among the Germans.
Elsevier Scientific Publishing Co., New York,

1976.

Bishop, James.
The Day Lincoln Was Shot. Harper
Publishing, New York, 1955This general look at the assassination is
minimally useful for the Stanton theme, though a
reflection of prevailing views.

90

Blaine, James. G.
Twenty Years of Congress. Henry Bill
Publishing Company, Norwich, Connecticut, 1884.
Some unusually candid insights into Stanton’s
personality from a prominent Unionist, though not
generally useful.
y
Bryan, George S. The Great American My t h . Carrick and
Evans, New York, 1940.
The best early account of the assassination and
the subsequent conspiracy theories, Bryan’s work was a
fundamental part of the historiographical analysis.
Campbell, Helen Jones.
The Case for Mrs. Surratt.
P u t n a m ’s Sons, New York, 1943.
C a m p b e l l ’s book demonstrates how solidly
Eisenschiml’s ideas took hold in assassination
historigraphy.

G. P.

Crosby, Faye. Evaluating Psychohistorical Explanations. 5
Psychohistory Review 6 (1977).
Davis, David Brion.
The Fear of Conspiracy. Cornell
University Press, Ithaca, New York, 1971.
This book contains excellent essays by historians
on the conspiracy manias that have frequently swept
the United States.
_______________ . The Slave Power Conspiracy and the
Paranoid St y l e . Louisiana State University Press,
Baton Rouge, 1969.
An i n t e r e s t i n g l o o k at the o r igi ns and scope of
the conspiracy phobia surrounding the South and
slavery.
Eisenschiml, Otto. Why Was Lincoln Murd ere d? Halycon
House, New York, 1939.
The principal work on the evidence against
Stanton, this book was the basis of Chapter I.
Flower, Frank. Edwin McMasters Stanton. Saalfield
Publishing Company, Akron, Ohio, 1905While laudatory and superficial in many ways,
Flower inadvertently reveals much of Stanton’s
personality.
George, A. L. and J. L. Woodrow Wilson and Colonel House.
John Day Co., New Y o r k , 1956.
Gorham, George.
Life and Public Services of Edwin Stanton.
Houghton Mifflin Company, Boston, 1899*
Even more superficial than Flower, Stanton’s
first biographer was of little help.

91

Grant, Ulysses.
Personal Memoirs. 2 Volumes.
New York,
1885.
Grant has some interesting insights on Stanton,
and they are quite objective.
Greenstein, Fred I. Personality and Pol it ic s.
Markham Publishing, Chicago, 19^9•
Hanchett, William.
The Lincoln Murder Conspiracies.
University of Illinois, Springfield, 1983.
Hanchett sets up.the need for this thesis by
explaining al l of the various theories without
accounting for Stanton’s actions.
Harper, Robert.
Lincoln and the Press. McGraw-Hill Book
Company, New York, 1951.
Useful information of how Stanton believed some
papers to be agents of the rebel conspiracy.
Higdon, Hal.
The Union vs. Dr. M u d d . Folle tt Publishing,
Chicago, 19^4.
An objective look at M u d d ’s case.
Lewis, Lloyd.
Myths After Linco ln . Grossett and Dunlap,
New York, 1957.
A defender of Stanton, Lewis almost unconsciously
legitimizes the paranoid attitudes of the Lincoln
period .
Oldroyd, Osborn.
Assassination of Abraham Linco ln.
Privately Printed, Washington, 1901.
A vigorous defender of the Stanton and government
case, Oldroyd does contain some information useful on
the subject of the assassination, including the
contents of B o o t h ’s diary.
Pratt, Fletcher.
Stanton:
Lin co ln’s Secretary of Wa r .
Greenwood Press, Westport, Connecticut, 1953*
Not very useful, as it is superficial and
inaccurate.
Randall, James G. Lincoln the President. Volume 4-* Dodd,
Meade, and Company, -New York, 1955.
Some information is provided on Stanton and the
Press.
Roscoe, Theodore.
The Web of Conspiracy. Prentice-Hall
Company, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, 1960.
Shows the continuation of the Eisenschiml theme.

92

Sherman, W i llia m Tecumseh.
Memoirs* 2 Volumes.
D.
Appleton and Company, 1875The Sherman-Stanton controversy is viv id ly
revealed in Sher ma n’s memoirs.
Strozier, Charles and Daniel Offer, Editors.
The Leader;
Psychohistorical Essays. Plenum Press, New York, T985.
Thomas, Benjamin and Harold Hyman.
Stanton:
The Life and
Times of Li n c o l n ’s Secretary of Wa r . Alfred A. Knopf,
New York, 1962.
A principal,source for this thesis, and
interesting in that no hint of the paranoid thesis is
fo u n d .
Turner, Thomas.
Beware the People Weeping:
Public Opinion
and the Assassination of Abraham Li nc ol n. Louisiana
State University Press, Baton Route, 1982.
An interesting attempt to explain some of
Stanton’s actions on the basis of common sense, and a
prime source for the historiographical analysis.
Williams, T. Harry.
Lincoln and the Radical s. University
of Wisconsin Press, Madison, 194-1Sheds some light on Stanton’s la bel ling of
McClellan as a traitor.
2.

Periodicals

Brodie, Bernard.
”A Psychoanalytic Interpretation of
Woodrow Wilson,” Psychoanalysis and History, Bruce
Mazlish, Editor, P r e nt ice- Ha ll , Englewood Cliffs, New
Jersey, 1963.
Cooney, Charles.
”At the Trial of the Lincoln
Conspirators," 12 Civil War Times Illustrated 9
(1973).
Reveals Commission member Kautz’s feelings on the
trial.
Farr,

Clifford, "The Civil War Correspondence of Dr. Thomas
Kirkbride,” 83 Pennsylvania Magazine of History and
Biography 85 (1959).
An interesting comment on the effect of War
Department work on the health of Edwin Stanton.

Fehrenbacher, Don.
In Quest of the Psychohistorical
Lincoln,” Reviews in American History, March, 1983*
Fitzpatrick, John.
"Problematic Features of Erik Erikson’s
Psychohistory,” 5 Psychohistory Review 16 (1976).

93
Fowler, Robert, "Was Stanton Behind Lincoln's Murder," 3
Civil War Times 4- (1961),
A look at the Baker ciphers found in 1961.
Frank, Seymour, "The Conspiracy to Implicate the
Confederate Leaders," 4-0 Mississippi V al le y Historical
Review 629 (1 954-) *
A useful, excellent treeatment of Stanton's
attempt to implicate Jefferson Davis in the
assassination conspiracy.
Hoffer, Peter C.
"Is Psychohistory Rea ll y History," 7
Psychohistory Review 6 (1979)*
__________________. "Psychohistory and Group Affiliation," 9
Journal of Interdisciplinary History 132 (1978).
Issacson, Alfred, "John Surratt and the Lincoln
Assassination Plot," 52 Maryland Historical Magazine
321 (1957).
Some information on Stanton's revocation of the
award for Sur ra tt’s capture.
Izenberg, Gerald.
"Psychohistory and Intellectual
History," 14- History and Theory 134- (1975) •
Johnson, A. E. H.
"Reminiscences of the Honorable Edwin M.
Stanton," 13 Columbia Historical Society Records 67
(1 910 ).
Interesting quotation on Stanton's fear of
presidential assassination in January, 1861.
Kinsman, Robert et al.
"Levels of Psychological Experience
in Asthma," 36 Journal of Clinical Psychology 553
(1980 ).
Mental effects of severe asthma.
Jones,
Nelson et al.
"Personality Profiles in Asthma," 32
Journal of Clinical Psychology 284- (1976).
Mental effects, including personality, of severe
asthma.
Langer, William.
"The Next Assignment," Psychoanalysis and
Histo ry, Bruce Mazlish, Editor, Prentice-Hal1,
Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, 1963Manuel, Frank.
"The Use and Abuse of Psychohistory," 100
Daedulus 187 (1971).
Mazlish, Bruce.
"Psychoanalysis and History,"
Psychoanalysis and History, Bruce Mazlish, Editor,
Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, 1963-

94

Mazlish, Bruce.
"Reflections on the State of
Psychohistory,n 5 Psychohistory Review 3 (1977).
P y e , Lucien.
"Personal Identity and Political Ideology,"
Psychoanalysis and Histo ry , Bruce Mazlish, Editor,
Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, 1963*
Scruben, Francis, "Edwin Stanton and Reconstruction," 23
Tennessee Historical Quarterly 454 (1964).
Takes a good lo ok at St anton and C a t h o l i c s in a
lengthy footnote.
Straker, Norman et al.
"Aggression and Childhood Asthma:
A
Study," 18 Journal of Psychomatic Research 157 (1974).
More insight into the mental effects of asthma.
Weinstein, Fred and Gerald Platt.
"The Coming Crisis in
Psychohistory," 47 Journal of Modern History 199
(1975).
Woods, Joseph.
"Some Considerations on Psychohistory," 36
The Historian 722 (1974)*
3•

Theses and Dissertations

Crenson, Gus, "Andrew Johnson and Edwin M. Stanton,"
Masters Thesis Completed at Georgetown University,
1949.
A detailed look at the Johnson-Stanton struggle
1865-1867.
Drozdowski, Eugene, "Edwin M. Stanton, Lincoln's Secretary
of War," Doctoral Dissertation Completed at Duke
University, 1964*
An exhaustive view of Stanton's first two years
as Secretary of War with a substantial amount of
information not included in Hyman and Thomas.

95

VITA
Robert Lee Crewdson
Born in Harrisonburg,

Virginia,

September 20,

1961.

Graduated from Stonewall Jackson High School in Manassas,
Virginia on June 10,

1979*

Graduated Phi Beta Kappa and

M a g n a Cum Laude fr o m the U n i v e r s i t y of the South on M a y 22,
1983 with a B.A.

(Honors) in American History.

Author of several articles on the Civil War period and
recipient of several writing awards,

the writer has served

in various intern capacities in both the political and
historic preservation fields.

The author completed his

requirements for the Master of Arts degree at the College
of Wi lli am and Mary in December,

1986 and continued his

final year of study at the University of Virginia School of
Law, where he joined the Journal of Law and Politics in
1985.

